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ABSTRACT 
  In debates about executive branch authority and policy innovation, 
scholars have focused on two overarching relationships—horizontal 
tension between the president and Congress and the vertical interplay 
of federal and state authority. However, these debates have 
overlooked the role of frontline bureaucratic officials in advancing 
the laws they administer. This Article looks to immigration law—in 
which lower-level federal officers exercise discretion delegated down 
throughout federal agencies—to identify how bottom-up agency 
influences can inform categorical, across-the-board executive branch 
policy. 
  In this Article, I argue that decisions by frontline officers can and 
should be better harnessed to pair local laboratories of executive 
experimentation with opportunities for interchange throughout 
various levels of the administrative bureaucracy. Notwithstanding the 
predominant (and often accurate) view that on-the-ground enforcers 
resist innovation, many frontline immigration officers have 
demonstrated willingness, and an ability, to put their discretion 
toward creative ends. 
  By exploring the interplay between bottom-up and top-down 
policymaking, this Article provides a useful counterweight to a 
number of conventional theories regarding presidential 
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administration, offering insights into debates about agency design and 
administrative constitutionalism. The relationship between on-the-
ground enforcement and across-the-board executive action can also 
lend greater legitimacy to the Obama administration’s deferred action 
programs—both in the federal courts and the court of public opinion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the Obama administration’s signature 
immigration initiatives,1 commentators have taken a renewed interest 
in the function of presidential power in bringing innovation to 
immigration law.2 Much of the literature has focused on two 
overarching relationships—horizontal tension between the president 
and Congress and the vertical interplay of federal and state authority. 
Scholars of administrative law have argued that administrative 
agencies tend to ossify and become resistant to change, requiring a 
series of top-down commands by the president and cabinet 
members3—“an injection of energy and leadership” that higher-level 
officials are best suited to provide.4 Meanwhile, federalism scholars 
see state and local action as promoting policy innovation that cannot 
be forged on a national scale.5 
 
 1. The Obama administration’s policies, discussed infra at notes 22–23 and accompanying 
text, would afford deferred action to millions of undocumented foreign nationals. The 
administration’s 2014 deferred action policies have been halted nationwide by a federal court 
injunction. See infra note 25.  
 2. See, e.g., SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015); Kate Andrias, The President’s 
Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2013); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, 
The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015); Anil Kalhan, Deferred 
Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on 
Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 59 (2015); Michael W. McConnell, Why 
Obama’s Immigration Order Was Blocked, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2015, at A15; Eric Posner, 
Faithfully Executed: Obama’s New Immigration Program Is Perfectly Legal and Should Not Be 
Blocked, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2015, 3:23 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ politics/
view_from_chicago/2015/02/obama_s_dapa_immigration_program_is_legal_judge_hanen_s_
injunction_will.single.html [http://perma.cc/K7ZA-JQU4]; Peter M. Shane, Judge Hanen’s 
Misconceptions and the Legality of Deferred Action, ACS BLOG (Mar. 16, 2015), http://
www.acslaw.org/acsblog/judge-hanen’s-misconceptions-and-the-legality-of-deferred-action 
[http://perma.cc/8J8N-T83T]. 
 3. Andrias, supra note 2, at 1054–69; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 135–42. For 
additional sources discussing presidential influences on agency action, see generally James F. 
Blumenstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and 
Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851 (2001); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 103 (1994); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-
Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013); Matthew C. Stephenson, 
Optimal Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008). 
 4. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2344.  
 5. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1122 (2014); 
Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons from the Same-Sex 
Marriage Debate, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133, 1152 (2014); Heather K. Gerken, A New 
Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY J., Spring 2012, http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/a-
new-progressive-federalism.php?page=all [http://perma.cc/9B6C-PXWA]; see also Thomas W. 
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Although commentators have noted how presidential 
administrations and state legislatures can fill a gap left by Congress,6 
they have generally not considered ways that frontline officers can 
advance the laws they administer. This Article assesses various 
sources of bottom-up lower-level innovation by analyzing 
immigration enforcement discretion—in particular the relationship 
between case-by-case exercises of discretion on the ground and 
categorical executive policies. Its account of bureaucratic 
administration offers alternatives to conventional analyses of the 
Obama administration’s 2012 and 2014 initiatives, which are generally 
couched in the president’s immigration power in particular,7 or his 
constitutional enforcement power more generally.8 And while most 
 
Kelty, Federalism: While the Stewards Slept . . . New York v. United States, 29 URB. LAW. 529, 
548 (1997) (noting that “states serve as laboratories for experimentation”); Clifford Larsen, 
States Federal, Financial, Sovereign and Social. A Critical Inquiry into an Alternative to 
American Financial Federalism, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 477–78 (1999) (“[T]he United States 
also looks to the concept of the ‘laboratory of the states’ as a method for increasing government 
efficiency.”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 567 (2008) (explaining the significance of state and local actors). 
 6. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006) (“Publius’s view of separation 
of powers presumes three branches with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers, yet 
legislative abdication is the reigning modus operandi.”); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the 
Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 19 (2014) (arguing that conditions of abject 
congressional failure can give rise to more permissible and broader invocations of presidential 
power). 
 7. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 130–35 (discussing presidential immigration 
power through the structure of immigration law as a whole); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 510 (2009) (“In 
immigration law, there exists a broader basis than in many other areas of law for defending 
inherent authority as a matter of constitutional design.”). 
 8. See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, The Obama Administration, the DREAM Act 
and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (arguing that President Obama 
breached his constitutional duty to “enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all 
situations and cases” and that there was no such thing as a kind of “nonenforcement power” 
that can legitimate across-the-board deferred action policies); John Yoo, Opinion, Obama has 
Pursued a Dangerous Change in the Powers of the President, FOX NEWS (Oct. 12, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/10/12/obama-has-pursued-dangerous-change-in-powers-
president [http://perma.cc/A4R2-AZCW] (accusing President Obama of “push[ing] the 
executive power beyond all constitutional limits” and “deploy[ing] discretion to rewrite a 
federal law”); see also David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Editorial, Obama’s Illegal Move on 
Immigration, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2011, at A11 (noting that the president has crossed the line 
because although he “is entitled to establish enforcement priorities . . . the ultimate goal must 
always be” to execute the law as it was enacted by Congress); Kimberley A. Strassel, Obama’s 
Imperial Presidency, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2012, at A11 (arguing that DACA is one of many 
examples of the president granting himself “unprecedented power”); Michael D. Shear, Obama, 
Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/obama-immigration-speech.html [http://perma.cc/X6V8-
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scholarly treatments of the bureaucracy—both within immigration 
law9 and administrative law more generally—focus on how frontline 
officers have resisted change and necessitated top-down constraints,10 
this Article posits that bottom-up influences can help create—and 
even legitimate—categorical exercises of executive action.11 
Because the administrative process is predicated on “two 
different sorts of legitimacy[,] political (democratic will) and 
bureaucratic (expertise),”12 the interplay between lower-level 
enforcement decisions and across-the-board immigration 
enforcement policy has important doctrinal and theoretical 
dimensions.13 Although the variances that come with frontline 
discretion can raise difficult normative questions,14 the relationship 
between on-the-ground decisions and large-scale categorical 
enforcement programs has important, legitimacy-conferring benefits 
for executive policy—especially as President Obama has endeavored 
to fill voids created by congressional abdication.15 
 
LLPG] (noting that House Majority leader, Kevin McCarthy, has called the Obama 
administration’s action “a ‘brazen power grab’”).  
 9. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle 
Behind President Obama’s Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 667 (2016) (pitting 
“President [Obama] and his appointed agency heads, who have sought to use prosecutorial 
discretion to shield many unauthorized immigrants from deportation” against “frontline 
immigration enforcement officers and their union representatives who do not agree with the 
President’s agenda”); Kalhan, supra note 2, at 86–89 (describing how frontline officers “actively 
resisted” guidance from higher-up policymaking officials purporting to control and direct their 
enforcement discretion). Kalhan additionally notes that “[d]espite these efforts [to guide 
bureaucratic discretion], enforcement patterns in the field remained inconsistent and diverged 
significantly from priorities and guidelines established by policymaking officials.” Id. at 88. 
 10. Cf. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2344–45 (describing the bureaucracy as “encased in an inert 
political system” that “grind[s] inflexibly, in the face of new opportunities and challenges, 
toward (at best) irrelevance or (at worst) real harm”). 
 11. As argued in Part IV, infra, the idea that presidential action enjoys broad agency 
support and buy-in could be an important determinant for judicial (and congressional) 
deference to top-down immigration-enforcement decisions.  
 12. Katyal, supra note 6, at 2317; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (noting that “those with great expertise and charged with responsibility 
for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so”).  
 13. As discussed infra in notes 233–36, 240–50 and accompanying text, an inquiry into 
lower-level expertise has the benefit of refocusing analysis on a critical expertise rationale for 
administrative action that has tended to erode over time. 
 14. As explored infra in Part V, because lower-level discretion can interfere with progress, 
it requires careful review by top-level policy officials who not only have larger policy goals in 
mind, but also accountability for ensuring that discretion—subjective as it is—be dispensed as 
responsibly and equitably as possible. 
 15. See Pozen, supra note 6, at 24–26. Such congressional paralysis is hardly exclusive to the 
immigration arena; indeed, scholars have repeatedly remarked on how “the formal institutions 
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This Article highlights cases in which frontline officers have used 
their discretion to engage in problem solving that was later reinforced 
by, and reflected in, categorical resolutions at the highest levels of the 
executive. Although it does not offer empirical proof that lower-level 
bureaucrats actually influence higher-ups,16 it documents remarkable 
correlations between certain groundswells of case-by-case exercises of 
discretion and executive branch policy enacted months or years 
later.17 Thus, the case studies explored in this Article support 
enhancing existing mechanisms to promote greater coordination, 
learning, and deliberation among actors at all levels of the 
bureaucracy.18 Given the frequency of categorical prosecutorial 
discretion programs and attendant concerns of presidential 
encroachment,19 accords between higher-level officials and the 
bureaucratic corps could be a way of safeguarding executive policy 
against congressional or judicial override. In that regard, an 
 
of U.S. constitutional government have become impotent to deal with the nation’s most 
important challenges.” Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 479, 480 (2012). For a treatment of a similar phenomenon in the labor-law context, see 
James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 221, 223 (2005). 
 16. But see Deborah Anker, Legal Change from the Bottom Up: The Development of 
Gender Asylum Jurisprudence in the United States, in GENDER IN REFUGEE LAW: FROM THE 
MARGINS TO THE CENTRE 46, 67 (Efrat Arbel et al. eds., 2014) (“[I]ndeed there is now a 
ground-level jurisprudence that is having significant impact on other aspects of refugee law and 
decision-making institutions including at higher levels.”).  
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18. Although current immigration agency structures lack the formal qualities of purely 
“experimentalist” governance regimes, the mechanisms described in this Article indicate the 
possibility of an enhanced role for lower-level bureaucrats in reinvigorating immigration policy, 
supporting the idea that “under favorable conditions[,] the culture can coevolve with decision-
making practice so that both decisions and the standards for evaluating decisions improve in the 
sense of fitting better with the demands placed on the organization.” Charles F. Sabel, 
Rethinking the Street-Level Bureaucrat: Tacit and Deliberate Ways Organizations Can Learn, in 
ECONOMY IN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MICHAEL J. PIORE 113, 113–42 (Paul Osterman 
ed., 2012); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 340 (1998) (“The principal role of the national 
government in domestic affairs . . . is to encourage and coordinate this decentralized 
decisionmaking, and to protect citizens against abuses of power—especially, and paradoxically, 
those abuses that may result from or be exacerbated by the pulverization of central authority 
itself.”); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 78 (2011) (calling regimes “experimentalist to the extent 
that they are designed to achieve local adaptation and aggregate learning by combining 
discretion with duties to report and explain, and by pooling information”). 
 19. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 2316 (noting concerns raised by “an executive that 
subsumes much of the tripartite structure of government”). 
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accounting of ground-level experiments could, over time, better serve 
top-down executive action. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the literature of 
top-down approaches to policy change that generally rely on a 
dichotomous framing of bottom-up versus top-down policymaking. 
Part II outlines the various roles that lower-level federal officers play 
in exercising prosecutorial discretion in removal proceedings—a core 
feature of immigration law that enables frontline officers to shape 
policy. Part III details four case studies that demonstrate the potential 
for bottom-up innovation—deportation relief for the spouses and 
partners of LGBT U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents 
(LPRs); parole in place for the family members of military personnel; 
gender-based asylum protection; and bureaucratic resistance to 
draconian, top-down policies mandating detention at the conclusion 
of removal proceedings. 
These first three Parts lay the groundwork for the normative 
arguments made in the balance of the Article. Part IV explores how 
frontline enforcement decisions could provide a partial response to 
the dwindling availability of statutory deportation relief and limited 
mechanisms for judicial review. Moreover, to the extent that case-by-
case discretionary decisions coalesce around certain groups of 
individuals, categorical discretion policies derived from work on the 
ground could warrant greater deference by Congress and the courts. 
Part V explains why an analysis of bottom-up innovation complicates 
theoretical discussions about ideal administrative-law frameworks, 
which tend to favor top-down mechanisms. It argues that 
commentators should pay closer attention to bottom-up innovation, 
without which it may be difficult to identify who the next DREAMers 
will be.20 The Article concludes with suggested reforms that would 
 
 20. The term “DREAMers” refers to those who would be eligible to take advantage of a 
path to citizenship created by the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors 
(DREAM) Act. The DREAM Act—which was first introduced in 2001—would defer 
deportation of certain undocumented foreign nationals who came to the United States as 
children. See Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2268 n.116 (2013); Julia 
Preston, Young Immigrants Say It’s Obama’s Time to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/us/dream-act-gives-young-immigrants-a-political-voice.html 
[http://perma.cc/V7BP-YBBD]. Since 2001, a version of the DREAM Act has been introduced 
either as a stand-alone bill or as part of other legislation numerous times, including in 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010, but it has never received enough votes to pass both the 
House and the Senate. See Elisha Barron, Recent Development, The Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 631–36, 632 n.77 (2011); 
David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 
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improve ways for higher-level agency officials to learn from 
experiments taking place in the field. 
I.  DISCRETIONARY FORCES AND IMMIGRATION INNOVATION 
President Obama’s second term has been defined by bold 
exercises of executive action, and nowhere is this truer than 
immigration.21 The Obama administration’s 2012 Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program provides a reprieve from 
deportation and work authorization to nearly 1.2 million foreign-
national youths who came to the United States as children.22 The 2014 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents (DAPA) program would grant similar opportunities to four 
million undocumented parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs.23 These 
programs have stirred controversy, with congressional Republicans 
raising the specter of impeachment proceedings,24 and twenty-six 
 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/19immig.html [http://perma.cc/4LUJ-3E
PE]. 
 21. See Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-
obama-bypass-congress.html [http://perma.cc/9D6P-WQ3W] (describing President Obama’s 
“We Can’t Wait” campaign “to more aggressively use executive power to govern in the face of 
Congressional obstructionism”). 
 22. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. 
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t 
(June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-
individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/LBJ4-Q5N5].  
 23. The 2014 reforms also include provisions expanding the parameters of DACA relief. 
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon 
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border 
Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_
deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/33X6-GWS4]. The 2014 reforms have been halted 
nationwide under a federal court injunction. See infra note 25.  
 24. See Jackie Calmes, Some in G.O.P. Fear that Their Hard-Liners Will Alienate Latino 
Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/politics/in-
immigration-fight-some-in-gop-fear-alienating-latinos.html?action=click&contentCollection=
U.S.&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article [http://perma.cc/5UHC-
US5N]. Although Congress did not follow through with the impeachment threat, the House of 
Representatives passed a number of measures that, if enacted, would invalidate the Obama 
administration’s executive actions regarding immigration. See Greg Sargent, GOP Deportation 
Priorities, in the Raw, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/01/14/gop-deportation-priorities-in-the-raw [http://perma.cc/QL3N-QD
MS].  
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states securing a nationwide district court injunction blocking the 
2014 reforms.25  
A. Top-Down Influences in Immigration Law 
The scholarly discussion of large-scale categorical programs 
tends to revolve around top-down presidential approaches via ex 
ante26 or ex post27 presidential control of bureaucratic action. 
Although these accounts vary in their assessment of its effectiveness, 
the overriding narrative is frequently one of presidential efforts to 
overcome administrative ossification, insulation, and inefficiency via 
an “injection of energy and leadership” into agency action.28 This 
discussion often relies on a dichotomous framing of bottom-up versus 
top-down policymaking that explicitly or implicitly tracks a discussion 
 
 25. On February 16, 2015, a federal district judge in the Southern District of Texas granted 
a nationwide preliminary injunction halting the 2014 deferred action initiatives based on a 
theory that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail in arguing that the Obama administration violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to subject the programs to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015). A 
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction. Texas v. United States, 
809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015). On January 19, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016). The president’s 
deferred action policies have been the source of other litigation as well. See infra note 93 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. Ex ante controls are those created when “government authorities and institutional 
designers delegate authority to an agent but at the same time set up a structure that constrains 
and channels how the agent exercises her discretion.” Matthew C. Stephenson, Information 
Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1439 (2011). They function by 
specifying, via various substantive and procedural mechanisms, “windows” of agency 
discretion—“the set of actions that an agent is allowed to select and the corresponding set of 
prohibited actions.” Id. at 1439–46. The president’s appointment of agency leaders with like-
minded policy preferences and issuance of administrative directives are examples of ex ante 
controls. See Blumenstein, supra note 3, at 895–97 (regarding presidential administrative 
directives); Nou, supra note 3, at 1765 (appointments). 
 27. Ex post controls are those measures by which the president oversees the decisions of 
agencies, usually to ensure their compliance with ex ante controls or other policy goals. See Nou, 
supra note 3, at 1766–67. Presidential review of agency rulemaking through the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the broader Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) is probably the most well-known example, but discretionary removal of agency 
heads is also a form of ex post control. See id. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013) 
(describing the structure and application of OIRA review); Steven Croley, White House Review 
of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003) (analyzing the 
effectiveness of review of agency action). 
 28. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2344; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, 
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1265 (2009) (noting that “[s]cholars have 
devoted a great deal of energy to thinking about whether and how Congress or the President 
should control administrative agencies”). 
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in administrative law about the centralization of authority in the 
Office of the President and the tools available to that office to control 
vast portions of the administrative state.29 
In contrast to this more conventional, top-down approach, a 
number of scholars have highlighted the importance of involving the 
bureaucracy through interagency review, coordination among 
different levels of actors among various agencies, and opportunities 
for filtering up comments from lower-level officers.30 Although these 
accounts have important implications for immigration enforcement, 
they may not adequately speak to the detailed and specific ways that 
frontline decisionmakers can affect agency reform. For example, 
frontline officers within the immigration bureaucracy have for 
decades made use of the president’s enforcement authority in their 
ordinary immigration enforcement decisions—at times putting those 
powers to creative ends. Although even the president’s most forceful 
adversaries do not dispute the validity of this source of bureaucratic 
power,31 there is little scholarly inquiry into how expertise at lower 
 
 29. See Blumenstein, supra note 3, at 895–97; Kagan, supra note 3; Lessig & Sunstein, supra 
note 3; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 (1995). 
 30. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1173–81 (2012) (noting the executive’s “well-established coordination 
instruments” such as its appointment powers, OIRA review, policy memoranda, and ability to 
create high-level task forces and councils in order to bring about meaningful agency 
coordination); Terry Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 16–18 (1994) (discussing how the executive branch “is not a hierarchy of 
[individuals,] but, more than perhaps any other major political institution, a team” where 
decisionmaking is delegated to lower-level actors, subject to various top-level control 
mechanisms (emphasis added)); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 213 
(2015) (arguing that executive “pooling” of administrative resources “augments [administrative] 
capacity by mixing and matching resources dispersed across the bureaucracy”); cf. Jon D. 
Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New 
Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 16), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2656498 [http://perma.cc/8ULH-XRAU] (reorienting 
bureaucratic control around “three constitutional branches working with, and against, three 
administrative rivals—which are simultaneously engaged in their own exercises of horizontal 
checking, balancing, and collaborating” and promoting a “two-dimensional understanding of 
vertical and horizontal engagement [that] illuminates a far more complicated set of connections, 
alliances, and conflicts,” exposing “the existence of a tripartite system of separated and checked 
administrative power that opens, forecloses, strengthens, and alters opportunities for 
constitutional actors to intervene”). 
 31. Notably, the plaintiff states in the Texas litigation did not challenge the Obama 
administration’s enforcement priority guidelines, nor did the district court’s preliminary 
injunction alter or address those enforcement priorities. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 
134, 166 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 784 (“It is true that 
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levels of the immigration bureaucracy might enhance across-the-
board executive action.32 Commentators have instead focused 
primarily on the top-down nature of executive discretion as 
exemplified by the Obama administration’s 2012 and 2014 initiatives. 
The wrangle over executive deferred action programs provides a 
useful entrée into policy innovations that emerge and take shape in 
the field, where agency officers have at times exercised their 
delegated powers in new and creative ways. Although scholars of 
administrative law and political science have described the effect of 
lower-level policy implementation on public perception of 
administrative policy goals,33 the expansiveness of executive 
prosecutorial discretion programs has produced little inquiry into 
internal separation of powers within the executive or the role of the 
bureaucracy in promoting policy innovation.34 Yet ordinary 
bureaucrats can promote innovation, and there are good reasons, 
particularly in immigration, for “public administration [to] integrate 
 
enforcement cannot occur in all circumstances. The ordinary, efficient administration of the law 
requires discretionary decision making on the part of enforcers.”). 
 32. For empirical investigations into the bases upon which frontline officers have exercised 
favorable discretion, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My Great FOIA Adventure and Discoveries 
of Deferred Action Cases at ICE, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 345, 347 (2013) [hereinafter Wadhia, 
Great FOIA Adventure]; Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819, 820 (2004). Both articles are discussed infra in Part III.C. 
 33. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY, at xii (1980) (“[T]he 
decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to 
cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry 
out.”); see also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, 
and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (2000) (noting a “new 
administrative paradigm . . . characterized by a return to discretionary forms of administration 
and an increase in the power that ground-level administrators wield over benefit recipients”); 
Susan S. Silbey, Case Processing: Consumer Protection in an Attorney General’s Office, 15 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 849, 850 (“[C]hoosing among courses of action and inaction, individual law 
enforcement officers become the agents of clarification and elaboration of their own authorizing 
mandates. Bureaucrats become lawmakers, ‘freely’ creating . . . law beyond written rules or 
courtroom practices.” (citations omitted)).  
 34. For an exception, see Sabel, supra note 18, at 117 (arguing for “the existence of formal 
institutions” in which frontline ingenuity would drive “organizational learning”). Cf. Diller, 
supra note 33, at 1130 (“[A]dministration cannot be separated easily from policy. The way that 
welfare offices are structured and operate becomes as much an instrument of welfare policy as 
eligibility rules and requirements [set by high-level administrators].”); Silbey, supra note 33, at 
850 (“By choosing among courses of action and inaction, individual law enforcement officers 
become agents of clarification and elaboration of their own authorizing mandates. Bureaucrats 
become lawmakers . . . [creating] ‘law in action.’” (citations omitted)). 
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frontline discretion and stake-holder participation in a disciplined, 
accountable manner.”35 
In the deportation context, frontline officers have been directed 
to utilize their vast enforcement discretion to make accommodations 
in meritorious cases, and they have, at times, used their discretion 
creatively, addressing problems that higher-level officials were unable 
or unwilling to resolve—at least at first. In some cases, categorical 
decisions made at the upper echelons of the agency have reflected 
lower-level enforcement decisions that appeared to reach a saturation 
point. Although supporters and detractors of the president’s policies 
remain locked in debate—with critics accusing the president of failing 
to properly execute the law,36 and supporters positioning the 
president’s actions within a long and established historical 
pedigree37—commentators have not considered ways that categorical 
executive policies might draw support from case-by-case decisions 
made on the ground. A more sustained treatment of the latter could 
yield valuable insights into across-the-board prosecutorial discretion 
programs both as a matter of theory and doctrine. The Supreme 
Court has explicitly recognized the “broad discretion exercised by 
immigration officials” who “as an initial matter[] must decide whether 
it makes sense to pursue removal at all.”38 An appreciation of case-by-
case discretion and its relationship to categorical programs such as 
DACA and DAPA could become an important aspect of the 
 
 35. Sabel & Simon, supra note 18, at 56. 
 36. See supra note 8. 
 37. See, e.g., David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The 
Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012) 
(arguing that congressional intent and consistent agency practices support the Obama 
administration’s 2012 prosecutorial discretion program for childhood arrivals); Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. SEE ALSO 59, 60 (2013) (noting that “prosecutorial discretion actions like DACA have 
been pursued by other presidents and part of the immigration system for at least thirty-five 
years”); Letter from Immigration Law Professors to President Barack Obama (May 28, 2012), 
http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754 [http://perma.cc/8ZVY-52E8] (noting that deferred 
action is “one of many forms of prosecutorial discretion available to the Executive Branch”); 
Ilya Somin, Obama, Immigration, and the Rule of Law [Updated with Additional Material on 
Precedents for Obama’s Action, and a Response to Timothy Sandefur], WASH. POST: THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/11/20/obama-immigration-and-the-rule-of-law [http://perma.cc/N8AD-BT
ML] (noting “past presidents such as Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush have 
systematically exempted large numbers of illegal immigrants from deportation”).  
 38. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).  
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conversation about the legitimacy of executive branch prosecutorial 
discretion programs. 
B. Bottom-Up Sources of Immigration Innovation 
Most of the discussion surrounding the Obama administration’s 
prosecutorial discretion policies focuses on the horizontal separation 
of powers between Congress and the president. Adam Cox and 
Cristina Rodríguez, building on their seminal work in this area, have 
provided a theory of “presidential policymaking” predicated largely 
on a top-down theory of executive action.39 This latest account, 
focusing on President Obama’s expanded deferred action programs, 
treats bureaucratic officers with understandable skepticism given the 
resistance to 2010 and 2011 enforcement memoranda directing 
favorable exercises of prosecutorial discretion in meritorious cases.40 
Other commentators who favor top-down approaches discuss how 
White House involvement can enhance the legitimacy of executive 
branch deferred action programs. For example, Kate Andrias argues 
in favor of a more high-level regulatory process for enforcement 
decisions akin to the role of Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) in the rulemaking process.41 She argues that this 
additional overlay of White House review should be formalized to 
promote coordination and transparency in other administrative 
arenas in which agencies exercise enforcement discretion.42 
This Article instead focuses on lower-level bureaucratic officers, 
who have exercised the president’s law-enforcement discretion for 
decades and whose decisions can be informative and influential on 
higher-level policymakers. On a macro level, this dynamic plays out 
between the agencies and subagencies that administer immigration 
law. These institutions have a wealth of regulatory experience and 
expertise that can not only inform the work of other executive 
departments,43 but also influence the president to support broad 
 
 39. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 224 (endorsing “presidential policymaking 
through enforcement . . . in the immigration context”). 
 40. Id. at 191–92. 
 41. Andrias argues that enforcement policies such as DACA can be evaluated based on the 
amount of transparency the White House brings to the policy. Andrias, supra note 2, at 1066–67 
(noting, as features of executive transparency, a presidential Rose Garden speech and White 
House blog entry). 
 42. Id. at 1067.  
 43. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 2345–48 (describing how bureaucratic overlap can provide 
an internal checking function). 
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executive action or induce Congress to take legislative action. On a 
micro level, the dynamic involves the influence of frontline expertise 
in a conversation with higher-level officials about the appropriate use 
of enforcement resources. Bureaucratic officers, exercising discretion 
delegated down through the immigration agencies and memorialized 
within decades of top-down directives, can shape longstanding agency 
practices and “administrative common law” to influence and help 
drive across-the-board action throughout the agency.44 
Although these kinds of bottom-up influences would not 
approximate a purely experimentalist regime,45 they could foster some 
of the benefits associated with experimentalism, including the type of 
reflexive dynamic, or feedback loop, that can develop in the interplay 
between exercises of frontline enforcement and decisions by upper-
echelon officials. Such a process would allow for additional 
experimentation, bottom-up influence, and across-the-board 
policymaking.46 Recognizing the benefits of such a dynamic would 
bring into sharper focus the critical role of dedicated frontline officers 
in shaping innovative policies. Although the president assuredly 
“use[s the] powers expressly delegated to him by Congress to advance 
 
 44. See infra Part IV. For a broader discussion of higher-level consideration by the White 
House and the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in using precedent to create more articulated 
standards of conduct, see generally Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—At 
OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259 (2015). 
 45. Under a truly experimentalist regime, varied approaches taken by actors within the 
agency would be compiled and assessed by higher-ups. The agency would analyze this data to 
see what advantages and disadvantages are associated with each experiment as the basis for 
implementing new policies. See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalism in the EU: 
Common Ground and Persistent Differences, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 410, 411 (2012) 
(“[E]xperimentalist decisionmaking . . . is in effect an acknowledgment that no one at the center 
can have a panoramic view of the situation, but local actors cannot rely exclusively on their 
immediate experience. The best way to correct the limitations of each vantage point is to view it 
from the other.”). 
 46. Cf. Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 169, 169–70 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011). As Sabel and Zeitlin 
explain, “[e]xperimentalist governance in its most developed form involves a multi-level 
architecture” with four key features that “are linked in an iterative cycle.” Id. That cycle 
includes “broad framework goals and metrics . . . established by some combination of ‘central’ 
and ‘local’ units, in consultation with relevant civil society stakeholders”; “local units [that] are 
given broad discretion to pursue these goals in their own way”; routine reporting by local units 
“on their performance,” subject to “a peer review in which their results are compared with those 
of others employing different means to the same ends”; and periodic review of “the goals, 
metrics, and decision-making procedures themselves . . . by a widening circle of actors in 
response to the problems and possibilities revealed by the review process,” after which “the 
cycle repeats.” Id. 
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his own immigration agenda,”47 that agenda—not to mention that of 
cabinet and other high-level agency officials—should also be 
informed by the expertise of frontline officers who exercise discretion 
in their daily enforcement of immigration law.48 
II.  THE STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF IMMIGRATION 
EXPERIMENTATION 
The undertheorized power of the immigration bureaucracy 
begins with a discussion of two mechanisms for innovation within the 
immigration arena. First, frontline immigration bureaucrats have 
been delegated the executive’s discretionary law-enforcement power, 
which they can put toward creative ends;49 second, multiple and 
overlapping agencies often possess jurisdiction over the same 
immigration issues. Although frontline discretion and overlapping 
agency jurisdiction are not entirely unique to immigration—they can 
be found in areas as disparate as environmental law,50 criminal 
enforcement,51 corporate governance,52 and national security53—the 
 
 47. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 116.  
 48. CORNELL G. HOOTON, EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE 5–6 (1997) (“[C]areer officials . . . 
are the people who most directly interpret, administer, and embody policies on a day-to-day 
basis, who determine in large part the policy alternatives that are immediately available to 
presidential appointees, and who provide continuity of government from one set of political 
executives to the next.”). 
 49. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All 
Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel 3 (June 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion] (stating that “[p]rosecutorial 
discretion in civil immigration enforcement matters . . . may be exercised, with appropriate 
supervisory oversight, by [a range of] ICE employees according to their specific responsibilities 
and authorities”); id. (“ICE attorneys may exercise prosecutorial discretion in any immigration 
removal proceeding before [the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)], on referral 
of the case from EOIR to the Attorney General, or during the pendency of an appeal to the 
federal courts, including a proceeding proposed or initiated by CBP or USCIS.”).  
 50. Todd Aagaard has examined overlaps between the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), noting in particular 
the “significant regulatory overlap between the two agencies with respect to occupational risks 
that arise from workplace exposure to contamination.” Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, 
Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 242 (2011); see 
id. (“OSHA regulates pursuant to its authority under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
whereas the EPA regulates occupational risks pursuant to various environmental statutes.”). 
 51. See generally Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: 
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977) (noting ways that the overlap between 
state and federal courts helped to advance the development of constitutional criminal 
procedure). 
 52. Robert Ahdieh has examined overlap between the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and other regulatory bodies. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 
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immigration arena illustrates ways that internal separation of powers 
can produce a dialogue between experts at the highest and lowest 
echelons of the executive branch. 
A. Separation of Powers in Immigration Law 
The first feature of bottom-up innovation concerns the ability of 
frontline officers to exercise prosecutorial discretion—the authority 
to decide whether and to what extent to enforce the law against 
someone.54 Under current resource constraints,55 prosecutorial 
discretion is a critically important tool in immigration enforcement, 
and it is used in a wide variety of contexts. As scholars have noted, 
the term “prosecutorial discretion” is actually a slight misnomer 
because the power is broader than its name implies; prosecutorial 
 
38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 865–66, 875, 923 (2006) (discussing the benefits of overlapping 
enforcement jurisdictions between the SEC and New York Attorney General’s office); id. at 879 
(“[T]he SEC is increasingly less and less alone in its regulatory pursuits. Rather, its jurisdiction 
increasingly overlaps with that of its subnational, foreign, and transnational counterparts.”). Jill 
Fisch has also noted ways that federal and state officials compete to regulate corporate 
governance. See Jill E. Fisch, Institutional Competition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on 
Macey, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 617, 619–23 (2005).  
 53. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 2324. 
 54. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49 at 2 (defining 
prosecutorial discretion as the decision “not to assert the full scope of the enforcement authority 
available to the agency in a given case”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE FACT SHEET ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION GUIDELINES 
(2000) (“Prosecutorial discretion is the authority that every law enforcement agency has to 
decide whether to exercise its enforcement powers against someone.”); Memorandum from Bo 
Cooper, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization Servs., to Comm’r, Immigration & 
Naturalization Servs. 3 (July 11, 2000), http://shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretiomemo
cooper.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3TZ-NFZ5] (“Because . . . the INS does not have the resources 
fully and completely to enforce the immigration laws against every violator, it exercises 
prosecutorial discretion thousands of times every day . . . . [T]he removal of criminal aliens and 
the deterrence of alien smuggling, are examples of discretionary enforcement decisions.”); 
Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Servs., to Reg’l 
Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, Reg’l and Dist. Counsel 1 (Nov. 17, 2000) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (“Service officers are not only authorized by law but expected to 
exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of the enforcement process.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and 
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) [hereinafter Wadhia, Sharing 
Secrets] (“According to the agency’s own statistics, [the government] has the resources to 
remove less than 4% of the total undocumented population.”); see also The Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the U.S & to Defer 
Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 9 (2014) [hereinafter OLC Opinion], http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/F4ZC-8UQW] (noting “striking” resource constraints and “the practical reality 
that the number of aliens who are removable under the INA vastly exceeds the resources 
Congress has made available to DHS for processing and carrying out removals”). 
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discretion encompasses a broad spectrum of discretionary 
enforcement decisions well beyond those made during an 
immigration proceeding or by a prosecuting attorney. For example, it 
includes prioritizing certain conduct or offenses for enforcement; 
deciding whom to stop, question, and arrest; deciding to detain and 
charge an individual, or to release the individual on bond, and the 
conditions of such release; granting deferred action, stays of removal 
orders, parole, voluntary departure, or other actions in lieu of 
removing a noncitizen; deciding whether to pursue an appeal; and 
executing a removal order.56 
1. Prosecutorial Discretion.  Executive enforcement power in 
immigration rests with the president, the attorney general, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and three of DHS’s 
enforcement subagencies—Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 
and Customs and Border Protection (CBP).57 Prosecutorial discretion 
provides important flexibility in cases where the costs of deportation 
far outweigh the benefits,58 and frontline officers have been delegated 
the power to grant favorable exercises of discretion on a case-by-case 
 
 56. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49, at 2–3; see also Wadhia, 
Great FOIA Adventure, supra note 32, at 346 (“There are at least 25 different forms of 
prosecutorial discretion that DHS may employ to protect a noncitizen from removal including: 
not bringing removal charges against a noncitizen, not arresting or detaining a noncitizen, and 
granting parole to a noncitizen.”).  
 57. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 
CONN. PUB. INT’L L.J. 243, 257 (2010) [hereinafter Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion]; Kelly 
Mannion, Note, International Law, Federal Courts, and Executive Discretion: The Interplay in 
Immigration Detention, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1217, 1232 (2013). 
 58. See Executive Immigration Enforcement Limitations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration Policy and Enforcement and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10–11 
(2011) [hereinafter Immigration Enforcement Limitations Hearing] (statement of Prof. Margaret 
D. Stock), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Stock07262011.pdf [http://perma.cc/
QW4D-NVC9]. In that hearing Margaret D. Stock stated,  
The costs of deporting someone are substantial; deportation costs include the 
expenses of arrest, detention, hearings, and physical removal. Congress has not 
provided the Department of Homeland Security with the funding or resources to 
deport every immigration law violator. When faced with a choice of allocating limited 
enforcement dollars between, for example, undocumented aliens engaged in criminal 
activities and individuals who were brought to this country illegally as young children 
through no fault of their own, who have subsequently succeeded in school, and who 
now enjoy, extensive community (and often Congressional delegation support) for 
their remaining in the country, DHS has reasonably prioritized enforcement action 
against the undocumented aliens engaged in criminal activity.  
Id. 
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basis to advance a number of humanitarian goals.59 As discussed 
below, there are other, nonprosecutorial immigration personnel who 
also possess discretion, and exercise it, to produce bottom-up 
influences on agency higher-ups.60 
2. Agency Redundancies.  A second attribute of immigration 
innovation concerns overlapping authority across various subagencies 
that exercise enforcement discretion, creating novel opportunities for 
dialogue and enhancing the potential for different actors—with their 
respective interests, perspectives, and pedigrees—to influence agency 
policy. Overlapping agency structures within DHS and DOJ bring 
enhanced checks and balances that deepen the possibilities for 
dialogue and debate.61 
Officers within three different DHS subagencies have a role in 
prosecutorial discretion. First are the DHS trial attorneys within 
ICE—prosecutors who appear before immigration judges and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and who can exercise 
discretion by making recommendations to administratively close 
removal cases.62 ICE also houses a contingent of ground-level officers 
on the frontline of enforcement who are often the last resort for 
foreign nationals seeking to avoid the execution of a removal order.63 
Second are benefits administrators within USCIS, the subagency 
charged with adjudicating nonadversarial affirmative petitions and 
applications,64 who can also exercise prosecutorial discretion by 
 
 59. See infra Part II.B. 
 60. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 61. See Katyal, supra note 6. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 abolished the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and divided its responsibilities among the newly 
created DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ). Under the Homeland Security Act, the 
adversarial adjudicatory functions of immigration courts and the BIA are housed within DOJ 
and overseen by the Attorney General. The prosecutorial and enforcement functions, as well as 
the nonadversarial adjudicatory functions, are housed within DHS and are overseen by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 275, 291, 521 (2012); Margaret H. Taylor, 
Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in 
Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 483–84 (2007). 
 62. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.
dhs.gov/office-general-counsel [http://perma.cc/RG6A-NHZV]. 
 63. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS (2011), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/
tool-kit-for-prosecutors%20v.2%20linked%2005.02.11.pdf [http://perma.cc/VM32-46JF]; see 
also Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/
overview [http://perma.cc/S3PK-ZJ85]. 
 64. A leading example is the marriage-based adjustment of status application—the process 
by which an eligible individual already in the United States can obtain permanent resident 
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holding cases in abeyance or granting deferred action.65 Third are 
officers within CBP, who handle border-related enforcement actions, 
such as border patrol and airport inspections, and who can exercise 
discretion regarding whether or not to bring truncated, or so-called 
expedited, removal proceedings for those caught attempting to enter 
the United States.66 
Other, nonprosecutorial immigration officers (within other 
agencies) also possess important discretionary authority that can 
contribute to executive branch experimentation. Officers within the 
Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR)—including the BIA and the complement of immigration 
judges who decide removal cases,67 as well as the attorney general, 
who oversees the BIA—possess numerous discretionary powers 
ranging from granting continuances to administratively closing cases. 
Additionally, officers within the Department of State have the 
discretion to grant visas.68 As the following case studies indicate, these 
nonprosecutorial officers can bring to bear important 
considerations—based in humanitarian concerns and resource 
constraints—that DHS officers consider when granting favorable 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion. 
Owing to these overlapping institutions at both the agency and 
subagency level, oftentimes more than one (sub)agency possesses 
authority over the same immigration issue, subject matter, or foreign 
national.69 Consequently, foreign nationals interfacing with the 
 
status without having to return to his or her country of origin to complete immigrant visa 
processing. See Adjustment of Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/adjustment-status 
[http://perma.cc/X22C-6X2Q]. 
 65. Visa Retrogression, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.
uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/visa-availability-priority-dates/visa-
retrogression [http://perma.cc/KP4L-ACLQ] (last updated June 14, 2011). 
 66. See About CBP, CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., http://www.cbp.gov/about [http://perma.
cc/JF4N-BE89]. Those proceedings, as well as CBP’s exercise of discretion, are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 67. The EOIR is composed of immigration courts, the Office of the Chief Immigration 
Judge, and the BIA, which hears appeals of most immigration decisions. This bifurcated system 
of immigration functions is described supra at note 61. 
 68. See Ineligibilities and Waivers: Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF CONSULAR 
AFFAIRS, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/general/ineligibilities.html [http://perma.cc/AP
R7-NFXL]. 
 69. See Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 
2512, 2548 (2014) (noting that the creation of DHS in 2002 divided “[r]esponsibility for asylum 
administration” such that “DHS now has jurisdiction over affirmative asylum applications in the 
first instance, but . . . a DOJ component[] adjudicates the de novo review of [denied] 
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immigration system often come into contact with multiple 
(sub)agencies with the power to grant or deny relief. Such 
jurisdictional overlap can allow novel policy experiments to emerge 
within various subagencies that filter up to higher authorities within 
the executive branch. Thus, differing institutional responses of 
frontline officers within distinct agencies and subagencies, and the 
conflicts they create, can generate fruitful arenas for experimentation 
and policy innovation. 
B. The Evolution of Frontline Discretion 
For nearly five decades, agency memoranda have directed 
frontline officers to grant favorable exercises of discretion, based on 
an array of factors, in immigration enforcement. The bases for 
discretion have changed over the years, but they generally have been 
articulated through flexible and open-ended frameworks, leaving 
room for innovation in an officer’s daily decisionmaking. For 
example, one particular prosecutorial discretion memorandum—in 
place between June 2011 and November 2014—listed nearly twenty 
different factors relevant to a potential favorable exercise of 
discretion.70 Even the earliest memoranda on record contemplated a 
 
applications . . . as well as asylum claims raised defensively in removal proceedings”); see also 
Aliens and Nationality; Homeland Security; Reorganization of Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 9,824, 
9,825 (Feb. 28, 2003) (describing the jurisdiction and regulation overlap between INS and 
EOIR); Retrospective Regulatory Review Under E.O. 13563, 77 Fed. Reg. 59,567, 59,568–69 
(Sept. 28, 2012) (same).  
 70. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49, at 4. Morton listed the 
following factors as relevant to a favorable exercise of discretion: 
the agency’s civil immigration enforcement priorities; the person’s length of presence 
in the United States, with particular consideration given to presence while in lawful 
status; the circumstances of the person’s arrival in the United States and the manner 
of his or her entry, particularly if the alien came to the United States as a young child; 
the person’s pursuit of education in the United States, with particular consideration 
given to those who have graduated from a U.S. high school or have successfully 
pursued or are pursuing a college or advanced degrees at a legitimate institution of 
higher education in the United States; whether the person, or the person’s immediate 
relative, has served in the U.S. military, reserves, or national guard, with particular 
consideration given to those who served in combat; the person’s criminal history, 
including arrests, prior convictions, or outstanding arrest warrants; the person’s 
immigration history, including any prior removal, outstanding order of removal, prior 
denial of status, or evidence of fraud; whether the person poses a national security or 
public safety concern; the person’s ties and contributions to the community, including 
family relationships; the person’s ties to the home country and conditions in the 
country; the person’s age, with particular consideration given to minors and the 
elderly; whether the person has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or 
parent; whether the person is the primary caretaker of a person with a mental or 
physical disability, minor, or seriously ill relative; whether the person or the person’s 
spouse is pregnant or nursing; whether the person or the person’s spouse suffers from 
severe mental or physical illness; whether the person’s nationality renders removal 
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fairly wide range of scenarios supporting favorable exercises of 
discretion.71 An internal agency “Operations Instruction” from 1975 
directed that officers consider 
(1) advanced or tender age; (2) many years’ presence in the United 
States; (3) physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment 
in the United States; (4) family situation in the United States—effect 
of expulsion; [and] (5) criminal, immoral or subversive activities or 
affiliations.72 
Frontline discretion became increasingly significant in the wake 
of 1996 legislation that drastically limited statutory relief from 
removal, rendering increased numbers of cases ineligible for 
immigration relief.73 As a response, individual members of Congress 
pressured the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)74 
to make more expansive use of prosecutorial discretion in 
sympathetic cases.75 In 1999, twenty-eight members of the House of 
Representatives, including Congressman Lamar Smith, the principal 
author of the 1996 legislation, wrote a letter to Attorney General 
Janet Reno and INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, requesting the 
adoption of prosecutorial discretion in meritorious cases.76 
 
unlikely; whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or 
other relief from removal, including as a relative of a U.S. citizen or permanent 
resident; whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or 
other relief from removal, including as an asylum seeker, or a victim of domestic 
violence, human trafficking, or other crime; and whether the person is currently 
cooperating or has cooperated with federal, state or local law enforcement 
authorities.  
Id. 
 71. (LEGACY) IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS 
INSTRUCTIONS, OI § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975); see Wadhia, supra note 2, at 187–88 n.8.  
 72. Id.  
 73. See T.A. ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN 
FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 780 (7th ed. 2012); 
Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 252–55 (describing the Cooper 
memorandum written in response to the 1996 immigration reforms).  
 74. The abolishment of INS and its transfer of functions across DOJ and DHS are 
described supra at note 61.  
 75. See Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 252–53; Anthony Lewis, 
Opinion, Abroad at Home: The Mills of Cruelty, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 1999), http://www.
nytimes.com/1999/12/14/opinion/abroad-at-home-the-mills-of-cruelty.html [http://perma.cc/95
82-LBVP]; Mirta Ojito, Immigrant Fights Off His Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/04/nyregion/immigrant-fights-off-his-deportation.html [http://
perma.cc/NCH9-DE68]. 
 76. Letter from Rep. Henry J. Hyde et al. to Janet Reno, Att’y Gen., and Doris Meissner, 
Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Servs., on Guidelines for Use of Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Removal Proceedings (Nov. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Hyde Letter], http://www.ice.
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Subsequently, at the behest of Meissner, INS General Counsel Bo 
Cooper outlined the legal basis and limitations of the agency’s 
discretionary powers,77 which Meissner used as the foundation for 
published guidance on the principles underlying prosecutorial 
discretion and the bases on which it could be favorably exercised.78 
Importantly, Meissner instructed INS personnel to consider the 
totality of the circumstances of a given case, greatly expanding the 
opportunities for frontline officers to grant favorable exercises of 
discretion.79 
When INS was abolished in 2003,80 the entities that absorbed its 
functions—USCIS, ICE, and CBP, all within DHS—followed the 
same guidance for exercising favorable discretion. In 2005, William 
Howard, the head of the office charged with prosecuting all removal 
proceedings, issued a memorandum to all chief counsel describing the 
specific types of cases in which favorable exercises of discretion 
should be granted and concluding that “the universe of opportunities 
to exercise prosecutorial discretion is large.”81 Likewise, in 2007, 
Assistant Secretary of ICE Julie Myers released guidance on the 
effect of discretionary enforcement authority on arrests and detention 
practices against nursing mothers.82 Myers incorporated the Meissner 
 
gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/991104congress-letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/PP7P-GR
G2]. The letter conceded that “[t]here has been widespread agreement that some deportations 
were unfair and resulted in unjustifiable hardships.” Id. at 1. 
 77. Memorandum from Bo Cooper, supra note 54, at 4–7.  
 78. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 54, at 7–9. The memorandum provided 
a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered when deciding whether to favorably exercise 
discretion, including (1) the immigration status of the noncitizen, (2) the length of time spent 
living in the United States, (3) the humanitarian concerns contained in the INS Operations 
Instructions, (4) whether a criminal history exists, and (5) whether there was a history of 
immigration violations. Id. at 7–8. Other factors included (6) the likelihood of ultimately 
removing the noncitizen, (7) the likelihood of achieving the enforcement goals by other means, 
(8) whether the noncitizen is eligible for other relief, or is likely to become so, (9) the effect of 
an enforcement action on future admissibility, (10) any current or past cooperation with law 
enforcement, (11) honorable U.S. military service, (12) community attention to the issue, 
including public opinion and publicity, and (13) the resources of the agency. Id. 
 79. Id. at 8. 
 80. See Noël L. Griswold, Forgetting the Melting Pot: An Analysis of the Department of 
Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 207, 221 (2006); Wadhia, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 257. 
 81. Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enf’t, to All OPLA Chief Counsel 2 (Oct. 24, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 82. Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 
to All Field Office Dirs. and All Special Agents in Charge (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
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memorandum by reference, reminding ICE personnel of the agency’s 
responsibility “to use discretion in identifying and responding to 
meritorious health related cases and caregiver issues.”83 
Under more recent memoranda, the factors underlying 
prosecutorial discretion have been further expanded. In 2010, ICE 
Director John Morton issued a pair of influential memoranda that 
identified the agency’s enforcement priorities84 and reemphasized the 
broad availability of favorable exercises of discretion by officers, 
agents, and attorneys within ICE.85 The memorandum on 
prosecutorial discretion provided nineteen factors that ICE 
employees could consider when deciding whether to favorably 
exercise prosecutorial discretion in a given case. 
In 2012 and 2014, the Obama administration unveiled across-the-
board prosecutorial discretion programs for foreign nationals who 
came to the United States as children (DACA)86 and for the foreign-
national parents of U.S.-citizen and LPR children (DAPA).87 
Contemporaneous with the 2014 prosecutorial discretion initiative, 
the Obama administration modified its enforcement policies,88 
outlining three priority enforcement categories89 while retaining the 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 
to All ICE Emps. (June 30, 2010) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). This memorandum listed 
three categories of enforcement priorities—those posing a threat to national security or public 
safety, recent arrivals, and immigration fugitives. Id. at 1–3. Removal of immigrants that did not 
fall into these categories was deemphasized. MARC R. ROSENBLUM & KRISTEN MCCABE, 
MIGRATION POLICY INST., DEPORTATION AND DISCRETION: REVIEWING THE RECORD AND 
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 3 (Oct. 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-and-
discretion-reviewing-record-and-options-change [http://perma.cc/U9RQ-EDJ2]. 
 85. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49, at 1, 3–4. Morton 
amplified the role of ICE attorneys by empowering them to review the charging decisions of 
ICE, CBP, and USCIS at any stage in the removal process. Id. 
 86. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 87. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
 88. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t et al. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/M4AF-PD9P]. 
 89. See id. at 3–4. The first priority includes those immigrants who pose a threat to national 
security, border security, or public safety, including those arrested at the border while trying to 
illegally enter the United States, those convicted of non-immigration-related felonies, and those 
convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. at 3. The second priority includes those convicted of three 
or more non-immigration-related misdemeanor offenses (other than minor traffic offenses), 
those who have been convicted of a “significant” misdemeanor, those who have not been 
continuously present in the United States since January 1, 2014, and those who have 
“significantly abused the visa or visa waiver programs.” Id. at 3–4. The third priority includes 
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open-ended language of prior memoranda directing officers to grant 
favorable exercises of discretion in meritorious cases.90 
III.  IMMIGRATION AS A LABORATORY FOR EXECUTIVE 
EXPERIMENTATION 
In the case studies that follow, frontline officers placed their 
discretion at the vanguard of policy innovation by addressing certain 
immigration problems that higher-level officials could not or would 
not resolve. In some cases, a groundswell of favorable exercises of 
discretion later became reflected in across-the-board policies set by 
officials within the highest echelons of government. Though these 
case studies do not provide empirical proof that decisionmaking on 
the ground actually produced across-the-board change—the evidence 
is correlative, not causal—the case studies illustrate how lower-level 
enforcement decisions that converge around various policy solutions 
could be a basis for across-the-board policy. At a minimum, agency 
higher-ups should look to case-by-case exercises of discretion as a 
resource for generating information and new ideas. 
 
those who received a final order of removal on or after January 1, 2014. Id. at 4. Although the 
three categories of enforcement priorities are reminiscent of those identified in the 2010 Morton 
memorandum, the 2014 memorandum differs in three significant respects: First, the more recent 
memorandum lowers the priority for immigrants convicted of misdemeanors and provides more 
detail regarding the types of misdemeanors that make an immigrant an enforcement priority. 
WILLIAM A. KANDEL, JEROME P. BJELOPERA, ANDORRA BRUNO & ALISON SISKIN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., THE PRESIDENT’S IMMIGRATION ACCOUNTABILITY EXECUTIVE ACTION 
OF NOVEMBER 20, 2014: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 10 (Feb. 24, 2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/home
sec/R43852.pdf [http://perma.cc/HM68-E6ZY]; Legislative Update: 11/24/2014, FED’N FOR AM. 
IMMIGRATION REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/legislative-updates/legislative-update-11-24-2014 
[http://perma.cc/M6WC-9AAR]. Second, the 2014 memorandum increases the priority level of 
immigrants arrested at the border while trying to unlawfully enter the United States. KANDEL 
ET AL., supra, at 10. Finally, those immigrants who were issued a final order of removal before 
January 2014 are no longer an enforcement priority, provided they do not pose a criminal or 
national-safety concern. Id. at 9. 
 90. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 88, at 6 (instructing DHS 
personnel to consider factors such as “extenuating circumstances involving the offense of 
conviction; extended length of time since the offense of conviction; length of time in the United 
States; military service; family or community ties in the United States; status as a victim, witness 
or plaintiff in civil or criminal proceedings; or compelling humanitarian factors such as poor 
health, age, pregnancy, a young child, or a seriously ill relative”); id. (“These factors are not 
intended to be dispositive nor is this list intended to be exhaustive. Decisions should be based 
on the totality of the circumstances.”). 
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A. Caveats Regarding Ground-Level Discretion 
Before proceeding, a few caveats are in order. First, this more 
optimistic side of bureaucratic discretion cannot erase the numerous 
accounts in which agents have refused to grant favorable exercises of 
discretion in the most obvious and deserving cases.91 Indeed, during 
the past several years, many frontline officers have either refused to 
grant favorable exercises of discretion even in categories of cases 
designated as a low priority under policy memoranda,92 or challenged 
those memoranda wholesale by suing the government.93 To be sure, 
on-the-ground experiments require supervision by policy officials who 
have the bigger picture in mind, and the concept of bottom-up 
experimentation should not be decoupled from strong presidential 
leadership: in theory, lower-level experimentation and higher-level 
oversight work in tandem to move immigration law forward. But 
bottom-up experimentation, combined with top-down controls, could 
provide better mechanisms for a kind of dialogue that can lead to 
better policy learning and outcomes—a point that some at the highest 
levels of immigration policy have explicitly endorsed.94 Thus, it is 
 
 91. See Stephen Dinan, Dysfunctional Immigration Enforcement System Tears Apart 
Family, WASH. TIMES (May 13, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/13/
immigration-enforcement-system-dysfunction-tears-a/?page=all [http://perma.cc/4CPZ-GRKZ]; 
Holly Hines, Attorney: Pastor Max Villatoro Deported: ‘No Easy Way’ to Get U.S. Visa, IOWA 
CITY PRESS-CITIZEN (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.press-citizen.com/story/news/local/2015/03/20/
villatoro-deported/25092073 [http://perma.cc/PQ7S-K3RY]. 
 92. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 187–88 (noting resistance by bureaucratic 
officers to grant favorable exercises of discretion as spelled out in top-down enforcement 
directives and “routinely ignoring individual requests for deferred action”); Kagan, supra note 9, 
at 678–79 (noting frustration by “immigration activists who complained that sympathetic 
immigrants were still being placed into removal proceedings”); Julia Preston, Deportations 
Under New U.S. Policy are Inconsistent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, at A16 (noting uneven 
application of “administration policy to avoid deportations of illegal immigrants who are not 
criminals”); Terry Greene Sterling, Immigration Lawyers Say Enforcement of Deportation 
Memo Falls Short, THE DAILY BEAST (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2011/11/19/immigration-lawyers-say-enforcement-of-deportation-memo-falls-short.html [http://
perma.cc/W9FA-R3AU]. 
 93. See, e.g., Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that five officers 
within ICE did not have standing to sue the Obama administration over its 2012 DACA policy, 
despite the claim that the policy prevented them from carrying out a statutory obligation to 
enforce the nation’s immigration law and deport all undocumented foreign nationals). The 
plaintiff states in Texas v. United States have had more success. See supra note 25 and 
accompanying text.  
 94. Indeed, some at the higher echelons of policymaking have shown an interest in 
adapting based on the involvement of a broader range of stakeholders. Deputy Secretary of 
Homeland Security, Director Alejandro Mayorkas, announced at the American Immigration 
Lawyers Association conference in June 2014, 
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worth considering how to tap into the power of bureaucratic ranks for 
the potential benefits career officers can bring to the development of 
agency law and policy. 
To be sure, the decision by a presidential administration to take 
categorical action can result from a range of inputs—including the 
president, Congress, the federal courts, the media, and especially the 
immigration bar—that coalesce over time.95 And some of the 
innovation identified in this Article includes the work of advocates 
who, in conjunction with bureaucratic officers, found new solutions to 
immigration inequities. Nevertheless, many categorical executive 
branch policies emerged in the wake of a groundswell of frontline 
enforcement decisions—suggesting possible links between case-by-
case enforcement and across-the-board agency action. 
Although it may be easy to distinguish between top-down and 
bottom-up decisionmaking in certain cases, the distinction is not 
always obvious. Clearly, a directive from the president is top-down, 
while decisions initiated by frontline officers are bottom-up. For 
purposes of this Article, I will treat as top-down all measures taken by 
the president, cabinet members, undersecretaries, and policy officials 
that include midlevel personnel—all of which are directed downward 
to agents in the field. Meanwhile, bottom-up influencers are those 
field agents, frontline officers, or other members of the lower 
bureaucratic ranks who implement the law on a day-to-day basis, and 
who exercise discretion based on guidance articulated through policy 
memoranda.96 The point of drawing the distinction is not for the sake 
of a hard-and-fast rule about where various agency actors fall within a 
chain of command, but rather to understand an iterative and dialogic 
 
It is my plan to have ICE and CBP engage with you fully in the spirit of openness and 
transparency that are the hallmarks of good government and significantly in the 
service of justice . . . [and] collaboration. As individuals, groups, organizations or 
otherwise, we are stakeholders with a shared interest in the success of the immigrant 
experience in America. To that end, we must be open with one another, exchange 
ideas, advocate, agree or disagree, and ultimately work together to realize the 
promise of whatever decisions we make. 
Alejandro Mayorkas, Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Keynote Address at the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association Conference (July 2, 2014), http://www.aila.org/
publications/videos/aila-events-and-highlights/video-deputy-secretary-of-homeland-security 
[http://perma.cc/3DMB-TFMP]. 
 95. When immigration advocates seek change, they generally launch a multifront campaign 
that includes Congress, the White House, the courts, and the press. See infra Part III.B. 
 96. Immigration law may be somewhat unusual given that many ground-level officers 
throughout the various immigration subagencies arguably have, by virtue of their law-
enforcement discretion, an enhanced power that similarly situated officers within other agencies 
generally lack. 
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process between lower-level immigration officers and the higher 
ranks that, rather than predicated on a strict dichotomy, is a part of a 
larger and more fluid evolutionary process of policymaking. 
B. Immigration Innovation in Action 
The following four case studies highlight a number of different 
contexts in which frontline officers have put their enforcement 
discretion to creative uses. On certain occasions, immigration 
bureaucrats solved an immigration-law problem or conundrum that 
higher-level administrative officials refused to address categorically. 
On others, the lower-level bureaucracy resisted top-down 
immigration policies that were greatly out of step with the agency’s 
long-term interests and best practices. The case studies span (1) 
deportation relief for LGBT foreign nationals in relationships with 
U.S. citizens and LPRs, (2) the granting of parole in place for the 
immediate family members of U.S. citizen service members, (3) 
efforts to protect victims of gender-motivated persecution under 
domestic asylum law, and (4) bureaucratic resistance to policies that 
required automatic detention of foreign nationals ordered removed. 
Together, they highlight different ways that frontline discretion can 
constitute an important locus of subfederal policymaking, with 
tremendous potential for higher-level learning, innovation, and 
adaptation. 
1. LGBT Immigrants in Binational Relationships.  The first case 
study involves discrimination against gay and lesbian foreign 
nationals in relationships with U.S. citizens and LPRs, an issue that 
predates laws like the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which, for 
years, refused federal recognition to valid same-sex marriages.97 Long 
before the Supreme Court invalidated DOMA in United States v. 
Windsor98 and upheld the constitutional right of same-sex couples to 
marry in Obergefell v. Hodges,99 frontline officers within the various 
arms of the executive branch used their discretionary power to 
provide a reprieve to same-sex couples who faced separation because 
the law prevented them from seeking family-based immigration 
benefits. Although there was no basis for the foreign national to 
 
 97. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated in part by 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 98. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
 99. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). 
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obtain immigrant status, exercises of discretion on the ground allowed 
families to remain together within the United States.100 These 
favorable exercises of discretion occurred one at a time, without any 
guidance from higher-ups; eventually, after a groundswell of similar, 
case-by-case decisions by ground-level officers across DHS and DOJ, 
the Obama administration took across-the-board action by directing 
favorable exercises of discretion in all similarly situated cases 
involving binational same-sex couples. 
The first reported case of a binational same-sex couple involved 
Richard Adams, a U.S. citizen, and Anthony Sullivan, a citizen of 
Australia, who secured a marriage license in 1975 from a County 
Clerk in Boulder, Colorado.101 Marriage license in hand, Adams 
sponsored Sullivan for permanent residency as his “immediate 
relative” so that Sullivan could apply to adjust his status to that of an 
LPR.102 Legacy INS denied the petition because the couple “failed to 
establish that a bona fide marital relationship can exist between two 
faggots.”103 The Ninth Circuit upheld that decision in 1982.104 
Adams and Sullivan’s treatment by legacy INS is one in a long 
history of especially unkind and humiliating experiences suffered by 
LGBT immigrants and binational couples, which included a longtime 
ban on gay and lesbian entrants.105 The elimination of that ban in 1990 
 
 100. Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal 
Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 629–43 (2012). 
 101. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1036, 
1038 (9th Cir. 1982). In many ways, the Adams/Sullivan marriage was an instance of frontline 
innovation by both the Colorado clerk, Clela Rorex, who issued the license, and the county 
attorney, who concluded that Colorado law did not preclude granting marriage licenses to same-
sex couples. Robert Barnes, 40 Years Later, Story of a Same-Sex Marriage in Colo. Remains 
Remarkable, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/
40-years-later-a-same-sex-marriage-in-colorado-remains-remarkable/2015/04/18/e65852d0-e2d4-
11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html [https://perma.cc/ERC8-NQHZ]. Rorex was eventually 
barred from issuing licenses when then-Colorado Attorney General J.D. MacFarlane issued a 
contrary legal opinion. John Aguilar, Boulder County Begins Issuing Same-Sex Marriage 
Licenses; AG Says No, DENVER POST (June 25, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/
news/ci_26033269/boulder-county-clerk-begins-issuing-same-sex-marriage [http://perma.cc/U3
65-FLG8]. 
 102. Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1120. 
 103. See Barnes, supra note 101. The Obama administration issued an apology to Sullivan in 
2015 for “the disrespect shown toward you and Mr. Adams.” Id.  
 104. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038. 
 105. In 1952, Congress barred entry to noncitizens suffering from “psychopathic personality, 
epilepsy, or a mental defect.” Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(4), 
66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952) (repealed 1990). Although that phrase did not necessarily contemplate a 
homosexuality-based exclusion, the Supreme Court interpreted it as such in Boutilier v. INS, 387 
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did not improve the lot of many same-sex binational couples, who 
continued to suffer under the weight of discriminatory marriage laws 
that prevented them from staying together in the United States. 
Whereas foreign nationals routinely obtain permanent residency 
through marriage to a U.S. citizen,106 for decades the LGBT foreign-
national partners and spouses of U.S. citizens lacked access to that 
common immigration benefit—the problem facing Adams and 
Sullivan, and one that persisted until only very recently.107 
Even as the federal government began to recognize same-sex 
relationships for certain, limited positive immigration treatment in the 
1990s,108 LGBT immigrants facing separation from their U.S.-citizen 
or LPR partners still had to appeal to frontline officers to avoid 
 
U.S. 118, 122–25 (1967) (applying the statute to the case of a gay man). Congress later 
reinforced the exclusion of gays and lesbians by amending the immigration statute to exclude 
those with a “sexual deviation.” Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 
919. Congress did not repeal the bar on gays and lesbians from entering the country until 1990. 
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (amending 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182). 
 106. Spousal immigration (in which a U.S. citizen or LPR sponsors a noncitizen for 
immigration benefits) accounts for 25 percent of all LPR flow annually. RANDALL MONGER & 
JAMES YANKAY, DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2013, 
ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, at 3 tbl.2 (2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
ois_lpr_fr_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/8YJR-FDUG]; Cori K. Garland, Note, Say “I Do”: The 
Judicial Duty to Heighten Constitutional Scrutiny of Immigration Policies Affecting Same-Sex 
Binational Couples, 84 IND. L.J. 689, 702 (2009). 
 107. In the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (guaranteeing the freedom 
of same-sex couples to marry, see supra note 99 and accompanying text), and United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act); see supra note 98 
and accompanying text, the foreign-national spouses of same-sex couples can access all family-
based immigration benefits, including adjustment of status through marriage.  
 108. In 1993, the Department of State recognized the importance of allowing 
“nonimmigrant” foreign nationals (those coming to the United States temporarily for a specific 
purpose, such as a foreign-government official, student, or temporary worker) to bring same-sex 
spouses or partners with them. See B-2 Visa Available for Non-Spouse, Same-Sex Partner of L-1, 
INS Says, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 421, 422 (Mar. 29, 1993); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 41.31, N14.4 (2002); Telegram from Colin Powell, Sec’y of State, 
Dep’t. of State, to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, on B-2 Classification for Cohabitating 
Partners (July 1, 2001). Under this policy, the same-sex partners of nonimmigrants could apply 
for a visitor’s visa to accompany their partner to the United States. The policy remained in 
effect for nearly two decades, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, and was 
expanded in 2011 when the Obama administration issued guidance to make it easier to extend 
the partner’s status. See Policy Memorandum, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Security, Changes to B-2 Status and Extensions of B-2 Status for 
Cohabitating Partners and Other Nonimmigrant Household Members (Aug. 17, 2011), http://
www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2011/August/Cohabitating_Partners_PM_081711.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6378-7ZKM] (directing officers to consider a nonimmigrant’s cohabitating 
partnership as a “favorable factor” when granting extensions of the visitor’s status). 
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separation. And as the issue of same-sex marriage began to gain 
traction nationwide, higher-level officials remained silent on the 
injustice of separating gay and lesbian binational couples. For years, 
progress occurred one case at a time—via frontline officer discretion. 
During the mid-to-late 2000s, as a growing number of gay and 
lesbian couples obtained marriage licenses in various domestic and 
foreign jurisdictions, immigration officers throughout both DHS and 
DOJ exercised discretion to spare LGBT foreign nationals with U.S.-
citizen or LPR partners and spouses some of the harshest 
consequences of the contemporaneous state of the law.109 Section 3 of 
the Defense of Marriage Act—which remained on the books until the 
2013 Windsor decision—prevented gay and lesbian U.S. citizens and 
LPRs from sponsoring their foreign-national spouses for family-based 
immigration benefits, including (but not limited to) spousal benefits,110 
resulting in the couple’s separation.111 For couples with children, an 
inability to marry or have a valid marriage respected by the federal 
government meant additional complications. 
Case-by-case favorable exercises of discretion occurred in a 
number of different ways. In some cases, DHS prosecutors took the 
initiative by moving to administratively close112 cases that were 
 
 109. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
 110. See Landau, supra note 100, at 630–31 & nn.39–43. In addition to spousal immigration, 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for a number of other family-based 
immigration benefits, all of which were unavailable during this time to the foreign-national 
spouses and partners of LGBT U.S. citizens and LPRs. Id. These include visas for foreign –
based fiancé(e)s, waivers of bars to inadmissibility that prevent foreign-national spouses from 
obtaining status as LPRs, and cancellation of removal—an important defense to removal—
which was unavailable to the foreign national unless he or she could claim the relief based on a 
U.S.-citizen or LPR parent or child. Id.  
 111. Not only would individuals without another basis for lawful permanent residence be 
required to leave the country (or possibly face removal proceedings), but if a foreign national 
left the country after overstaying a visa or otherwise accruing unlawful presence within the 
United States, he or she could face a lengthy bar from reentry into the United States as well. See 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (2012) (making inadmissible any foreign national who “was 
unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 
year . . . [who] again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien’s departure or 
removal”); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (making inadmissible any foreign national who “has been 
unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission 
within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal”). 
 112. See, e.g., In re Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 692 (B.I.A. 2012). Administrative closure 
removes a case from the immigration court’s or the BIA’s active docket, requiring either the 
government or the respondent to the proceeding to move that the case be recalendared before 
the judge (or reinstated before the BIA). See id. (explaining the result of an administrative 
closure). 
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pending before immigration judges.113 In other cases, immigration 
judges granted continuances for unusually long periods—perhaps 
with the expectation that the law would change in the near future 
such that the foreign national could take advantage of newly available 
benefits.114 And when neither option was available, or in some cases in 
which the foreign national was not (yet) in removal proceedings, 
foreign nationals would seek (and USCIS would grant) deferred 
action.115 Although different subagencies took different kinds of 
action, these various exercises of discretion ultimately coalesced 
around a common set of outcomes—namely, preventing LGBT 
 
 113. See Kirk Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings Against Immigrant in Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A16 (noting a June 2011 case in which the government 
moved to administratively close removal proceedings against a Venezuelan national living in 
New Jersey with a U.S.-citizen husband); Michael Bowman, U.S. Immigration Judge Suspends 
Deportation for Gay Spouse, VOICE OF AM. (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/
content/usimmigration-judge-suspends-deportation-of-gay-spouse-118741179/174610.html 
[http://perma.cc/9RT6-G68B] (noting a case in which the government filed a motion to 
administratively close removal proceedings against an Argentine who lived in Queens, New 
York, with her U.S. citizen wife); Chris Geidner, Immigration Judge Closes Deportation Case 
Against Married Gay Man, METRO WEEKLY (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.metroweekly.com/
poliglot/2011/08/immigration-judge-closes-depor.html [http://perma.cc/V762-W2M3] (noting the 
government’s motion to administratively close removal proceedings against a Venezuelan 
national with a U.S.-citizen husband); Officials Agree to Close Deportation Case Involving Gay 
Binational Couple, ADVOCATE (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2011/
12/16/officials-agree-close-deportation-case-involving-gay-binational-couple [http://perma.cc/
2D5S-PMWZ] (noting a government motion to administratively close removal proceedings 
against a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago with an American spouse in Massachusetts).  
 114. See Semple, supra note 113 (describing how DHS trial attorneys originally balked at a 
favorable exercise of discretion, which prompted the immigration judge to grant adjournments 
so that the agency could reconsider); see also Geidner, supra note 113 (noting how an 
immigration judge postponed deciding a case for two years). In the face of government 
opposition, immigration judges occasionally would order that the case be administratively 
closed. See Landau, supra note 100, at 641 n.102 (describing a decision by an immigration judge 
in Charlotte, North Carolina, to administratively close removal proceedings over DHS’s 
opposition). 
 115. See Press Release, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement on Anthony John Makk and 
Bradford Wells (Jan. 4, 2012), http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/pelosi-statement-on-
anthony-john-makk-and-bradford-wells [http://perma.cc/4MKC-YZ89] (reporting that USCIS 
granted deferred action to an Australian foreign national with a U.S.-citizen partner after the 
noncitizen spouse was denied permanent residence); see also Miranda Leitsinger, Gay Couples, 
Where Spouse is a Foreigner, Sue Over DOMA, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://
usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/04/03/11004440-gay-couples-where-spouse-is-a-foreigner-sue-
over-doma?lite [http://perma.cc/6WVL-55QQ] (noting that the government provided a South 
African national with a U.S.-citizen spouse a one-year grant of deferred action); John Yoo, 
Deportation Threat Lifted for Lesbian Vt. Couple, FOX NEWS (Oct. 12 2012), http://www.fox
news.com/us/2012/05/22/deportation-threat-lifted-for-lesbian-vt-couple.html [http://perma.cc/
FKM4-XCBU].  
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foreign nationals from being separated from their U.S.-citizen or LPR 
partners and spouses. 
As these novel exercises of discretion by lower-level officers 
began to take root, at least one higher-level official took similar 
action. In 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder certified a case from 
the BIA denying relief to a same-sex binational couple, vacated its 
decision, and ordered the BIA to consider whether the foreign 
national could seek deportation relief based on the harm of being 
separated from his U.S.-citizen domestic partner.116 Although it 
seemed clear under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that 
the foreign national was statutorily ineligible for the requested form 
of deportation relief in that case given that he was not a “spouse, 
parent, or child” of a U.S. citizen or LPR,117 DHS moved to have the 
case administratively closed on remand, sparing the foreign national 
from being separated from his partner.118 Indeed, the attorney 
general’s decision in that case, Matter of Dorman,119 precipitated a 
wave of additional decisions in which lower-level officers granted 
favorable exercises of discretion to foreign nationals in same-sex 
relationships with U.S. citizens.120 Through a feedback loop spanning 
both ground-level and high-level decisionmaking, actors throughout 
the agency made clear that the lack of formal legal protections for the 
foreign-national spouses of LGBT U.S. citizens and permanent 
residents would not be a bar to some effective form of reprieve. 
Eventually, the Obama administration took categorical action. 
On October 5, 2012, it provided across-the-board protections for all 
similarly situated same-sex foreign-national partners of U.S. citizens 
and LPRs, directing officers to consider granting prosecutorial 
discretion in such cases.121 After a wave of decisions by DHS 
 
 116. In re Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011). 
 117. The foreign national was seeking cancellation of removal, an important defense to 
removal that is limited to those who can establish, inter alia, “that removal would result in 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a 
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1) (2012). Non-LPRs who are granted cancellation of removal obtain permanent 
residency. See id. 
 118. Landau, supra note 100, at 640 n.92. 
 119. In re Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 485. 
 120. Email from Lavi Soloway, Immigration Attorney in Private Practice, to author (Nov. 4, 
2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 121. Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 
Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and James 
Dinkins, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field Office Dirs., All 
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attorneys, immigration judges, and benefits adjudicators within 
USCIS—as well as the attorney general’s efforts in Dorman—the 
agency eventually ensured that all similarly situated foreign nationals 
would receive equal treatment and be spared separation from their 
families in appropriate cases.122 
2. Parole in Place for Military Spouses.  The next case study, 
involving parole in place for the family members of U.S. service 
members, demonstrates not only the vertical interplay between lower- 
and higher-level personnel, but also how actors across multiple 
agencies can simultaneously create mechanisms for policy change. 
Parole in place had for decades been used to benefit Cuban citizens,123 
and it more recently became a mechanism to prevent military family 
members from facing separation. Like the binational couples context, 
this case study shows how possibilities for policy learning are formed 
not only in elite policy circles, but also through experiments forged on 
the ground and at all levels within the bureaucracy. 
U.S. citizens routinely sponsor certain family members for 
permanent residency,124 but those individuals must generally have 
been “inspected and admitted or paroled” upon entry to be eligible to 
adjust their status in the United States.125 Family members who cannot 
demonstrate proper inspection and admission (or parole) upon 
entering the United States, and who do not qualify for adjustment 
 
Chief Counsel, and All Special Agents in Charge (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.washingtonblade.
com/content/files/2012/10/9-Oct-12-PD-and-Family-Reltionships.pdf [http://perma.cc/R986-ZA
B6]. 
 122. See Email from Lavi Soloway, supra note 120 (noting a wave of favorable exercises of 
discretion to foreign nationals in binational same-sex couples prior to and after Dorman). 
 123. See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, to Regional Dirs., District Dirs., Chief 
Patrol Agents, and Reg’l & Dist. Counsel (Apr. 19, 1999) (describing Cuban parole in place 
policy), http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/Doris-Meissner-CAA-Memo.pdf [http://perma.
cc/RH73-Z8Z]. 
 124. Parents, spouses, and children under age twenty-one (often including stepchildren) of 
U.S. citizens are not subject to standard immigration quotas and are eligible to obtain lawful 
permanent residence without being subjected to numerical limitations. See Immigration and 
Naturalization Act § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (defining “immediate 
relatives” as “the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States, except that, in 
the case of parents, such citizens shall be at least 21 years of age”); id. § 1151(b)(1) (describing 
those not subject to direct numerical limitations). 
 125. Id. § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Certain exceptions exist for asylees, Cubans, special 
immigrant juveniles, Violence Against Women Act petitioners, grandfathered foreign nationals, 
and some others. See Margaret D. Stock, A Path to Citizenship for Undocumented Military 
Family Members, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, July 2012, at 1, 2–3; see also id. (explaining how 
foreign nationals can prove proper entry without documentary proof).  
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under certain narrow and special exceptions,126 confront the prospect 
of having to leave the country and undergo consular processing 
overseas. However, once these foreign nationals depart the United 
States, they often face bars to entry based on the period of “unlawful 
presence”127 accrued within the United States. That reentry bar 
effectively prevents those foreign-national spouses from adjusting to 
LPR status despite having an approved family-based petition. 
This issue was particularly troublesome for members of the U.S. 
Armed Services with undocumented spouses, who faced added stress 
when deploying overseas. In one case—the first publicly reported 
case of this kind—Army Specialist Alex Jimenez, a U.S. citizen, 
attempted to sponsor his wife, Yaderlin Hiraldo, for lawful 
permanent residence prior to disappearing when his unit was 
ambushed in Iraq.128 Hiraldo, who had entered the United States 
without inspection, was placed into removal proceedings and ordered 
to leave the country and seek an immigrant visa overseas, which 
would have triggered a ten-year reentry bar. When then-Senator John 
Kerry became aware of the situation, he prevailed on DHS Secretary 
Michael Chertoff to grant Hiraldo discretionary parole so that she 
could obtain permanent residency without leaving the country,129 and 
Chertoff agreed.130 
Although Chertoff’s action applied only to one case, the decision 
to grant discretionary parole spawned widespread media attention131 
 
 126. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Act § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (providing for 
possible adjustment of status of those physically present in the United States if they have had a 
petition for classification or application for labor certification submitted before April 30, 2001, 
were present in the United States as of December 21, 2000, and pay a $1,000 penalty). 
 127. See Immigration and Naturalization Act § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B). As 
explained supra at note 111, any foreign national who is unlawfully present in the United States 
for a period of more than 180 days but less than one year is subject to a bar on admission for 
three years from the date of departure or removal; if the foreign national is unlawfully present 
for one year or more, that individual is subject to a bar on admission for ten years from the date 
of departure or removal. See id.  
 128. See Stock, supra note 125, at 3.  
 129. Id. at 4. Unfortunately, Specialist Jimenez was later deemed killed in action. Id. 
 130. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff Agrees to Kerry’s Request to 
Protect Wife of Missing Soldier, U.S. FED. NEWS SERV., June 21, 2007 (containing text of letter 
from DHS Secretary Chertoff to Senator John Kerry, which described how Secretary Chertoff 
had directed that “ICE will grant Ms. Hiraldo discretionary parole into the United States”). 
 131. See, e.g., Marcus Baram & David Schoetz, A Military Wife’s Rock and Hard Place, 
ABC NEWS (June 20, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3297537 [http://
perma.cc/TJY9-3EYR]; G.I.’s Illegal Immigrant Wife Awarded Green Card, NBC NEWS (July 1, 
2007, 4:58 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19536767/ns/us_news-life/t/gis-illegal-immigrant-
wife-awarded-green-card [perma.cc/G2T4-VMFY]. 
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and precipitated discretionary grants of parole in place by lower-level 
officers in discrete cases.132 The interventions by Kerry and Chertoff 
appeared to have cascading effects, leading to a host of follow-on 
activity by frontline bureaucratic officers within “local USCIS 
office[s] having jurisdiction over [a] service member’s residence or 
place of duty.”133 For years, these case-by-case discretionary grants of 
parole in place allowed military family members to adjust status to 
become an LPR without having to leave the United States and 
undergo consular processing.134 Still, without formal guidance 
directing across-the-board exercises of discretion, practitioners 
reported variation and inconsistencies throughout various USCIS 
offices.135 
By 2010, favorable exercises of discretion in these military cases 
became an increasingly routine occurrence, with frontline officers 
taking a variety of approaches—including joining motions to reopen 
before immigration judges, granting deferred action, or deciding not 
to initiate removal proceedings in the first place.136 Secretary 
Napolitano was therefore able to acknowledge that “DHS utilizes 
parole and deferred action to minimize periods of family separation, 
and to facilitate adjustment of status within the United States by 
immigrants who are the spouses, parents and children of military 
members.”137 Finally, in 2013, after years of case-by-case exercises of 
enforcement discretion, DHS issued across-the-board guidance, 
 
 132. See Immigration Enforcement Limitations Hearing, supra note 58, at 4 (statement of 
Prof. Margaret D. Stock); Stock, supra note 125, at 4; see also Julia Preston, Immigration Policy 
Aims to Help Military Families, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/
us/01immig.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/878R-QUPX] (noting that officers provided reprieve for 
military families “on a case-by-case basis”).  
 133. Stock, supra note 125, at 5. 
 134. Id. at 3. 
 135. Id. at 5 (“Practitioners report[ed] a variety of different approaches at different USCIS 
offices.”). 
 136. 160 CONG. REC. H2328, H2329 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2014) (reproducing a July 2010 letter 
from various members of the House of Representatives to Secretary of Homeland Security 
Janet Napolitano noting that DHS could join in motions to reopen, consider deferred action, 
favorably exercise parole authority, forbear from initiating removal, or use other devices to 
“ease the burden for soldiers suffering from immigration-related problems”). 
 137. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to The Honorable 
Zoe Lofgren (Aug. 30, 2010), http://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/Napolitano-Letter-08.30.101.
pdf [http://perma.cc/K6CK-XPQJ]. Napolitano also noted ways that DHS, in conjunction with 
the State Department, collaborated to expedite the adjudication of various waivers to the 
reentry bar—discussed supra notes 111, 127 and accompanying text—or dependents who had 
already departed the United States and were seeking an immigrant visa through consular 
processing. Id. 
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instructing field agents to make parole in place generally available for 
the relatives of military members who were not inspected or paroled 
upon entry.138 
One particularly noteworthy feature of this story involves 
interagency communication, namely the Department of Defense’s 
(DOD) especially active role in prevailing on DHS to take a more 
consistent approach. DOD was concerned about morale problems 
that service members, worried about the status of their family 
members, would suffer in their ability to serve.139 DOD’s concerns 
were not entirely out of sync with the interests of the immigration 
agencies. Indeed, the BIA noted the same military-readiness issues 
when it granted cancellation of removal140 to an undocumented spouse 
and a four-year-old child of a U.S. service member deployed to a 
combat zone in 2010.141 Members of Congress highlighted the 
importance of the issue as well.142 
Even after DHS issued across-the-board guidance, DOD 
continued to press for more and expansive use of parole in place—
this time for the family members of U.S. citizens seeking to enlist in 
 
 138. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., PM-602-0091, CHANGES TO B-2 STATUS 
AND EXTENSIONS OF B-2 STATUS FOR COHABITATING PARTNERS AND OTHER 
NONIMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS; REVISIONS TO ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL 
(AFM) CHAPTERS 30.2 AND 30.3; AFM UPDATE AD11-27 (Nov. 15, 2013). 
 139. Id. (noting concern that military members would “face stress and anxiety because of the 
immigration status of their family members in the United States”). A former commander of 
ground forces in Iraq explained, “As a battlefield commander, the last thing I needed was a 
soldier to be distracted by significant family issues back home. Resolving citizenship status for 
family members while serving our country, especially during combat, must not be allowed to 
continue detracting from the readiness of our forces.” 160 CONG. REC. H2328 (daily ed. Mar. 
12, 2014) (quoting a letter from Retired Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez to the House 
Committee on the Judiciary). 
 140. In the case of non-LPRs, cancellation of removal is limited to those who can establish, 
inter alia, “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the 
alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012). When a non-LPR is granted 
cancellation of removal, he or she is granted lawful permanent residency. Id.  
 141. See Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation (HALT) Act: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 51 (2011) (statement of Prof. Margaret D. Stock). 
An immigration judge denied the wife’s application for cancellation of removal, and the BIA 
reversed. Id. The BIA recognized not only that the spouse’s removal from the country would 
cause great emotional distress to the military member, but also that removal would diminish the 
service member’s ability to fulfill his duties while deployed. See id.  
 142. See Hyde Letter, supra note 76, at 2 (“True hardship cases call for the exercise of such 
discretion, and over the past year many Members of Congress have urged the INS to develop 
guidelines for the use of its prosecutorial discretion.”). 
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the military.143 Again, based on DOD’s input, DHS Secretary Jeh 
Johnson “direct[ed] USCIS to work with the Department of Defense 
to address the availability of parole in place and deferred action for 
the spouse, parent, and child of a U.S citizen or lawful permanent 
resident who seeks to enlist in the U.S. Armed Forces.”144 DOD’s 
successful (and continued) effort in working with DHS demonstrates 
how the overlapping interests of different agencies reinforced top-
down, categorical enforcement policy. Thus, the military case study 
adds to those vertical checks (via case-by-case exercises of discretion 
on the ground) a horizontal layer (via interagency communication) 
that bolsters across-the-board enforcement measures. 
3. Gender-Based Asylum.  The next case study concerns the 
matter of asylum relief for victims of gender-motivated persecution. 
This vital issue has involved numerous immigration agencies and 
subagencies, at various rungs of the bureaucracy, in a conversation 
about how to protect individuals who are at risk of facing rape, 
domestic violence, or forced marriage upon return to their country of 
origin.145 Although the evolution of this issue is extraordinarily 
complex and difficult to trace, the absence of formal law on gender-
based asylum has not prevented dramatic change, thanks largely to 
work on the ground. Without any clear statutory protection146 or 
 
 143. As DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson noted in a November 2014 memorandum, DOD 
requested that DHS “expand the scope of its parole-in-place memorandum of November 2013 
to encompass family members of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who seek to enlist 
in the U.S. armed forces.” Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Customs & Immigration Servs. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference/additional-materials/immigration/enforcement-
detention-and-criminal-justice/government-documents/Parole%20for%20Families%20of%20
Military.pdf/at_download/file [http://perma.cc/RJ8M-QV9S]. 
 144. Id. 
 145. The cognizability of asylum based on female genital mutilation is clearer. The BIA 
issued a precedential decision on the subject of female genital mutilation in 1996. See In re 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996). Two years after Kasinga, the BIA denied 
protection to a woman who had suffered past female genital cutting. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
296, 296 (B.I.A. 2007). This decision, which seemed to undermine Kasinga, was vacated by 
Attorney General Mukasey in 2008 on the grounds that the BIA had erred in reasoning that 
female genital mutilation cannot occur more than once. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617, 621 
(A.G. 2008). Attorney General Mukasey outlined a framework for adjudicating asylum cases 
based on past persecution, which the BIA adopted in a new 2009 ruling. In re A-T-, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 4, 9 (B.I.A. 2009).  
 146. The doctrinal question that remained (and to some degree remains) unanswered is 
whether an individual fleeing persecution on account of gender satisfies the “particular social 
group” requirement in the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2012).  
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definitive BIA or federal court interpretation regarding gender-based 
asylum protection, the law has developed piecemeal, often through 
case-by-case adjudications in administrative and federal court. 
Through decades of incremental development, lawyers on the 
ground—both for immigrants and the government—“changed the 
culture of the relevant immigration agencies [and] the perspective of 
judges and other decisionmakers, in effect creating a body of 
jurisprudence at the administrative level, which, despite its 
nonprecedential nature, has had enormous impact.”147 Thus, “[g]ender 
asylum in the United States . . . tells an unusual story of legal change 
from the bottom up,”148 with lessons for interagency coordination, 
adaptation, and learning. 
Governmental efforts to protect victims of gender-based 
persecution date back to 1995, when legacy INS—then a subagency of 
DOJ—issued a guidance memorandum (the “Guidelines”) directed to 
asylum officers that outlined the basis for favorable grants for 
applicants who had experienced gender-based persecution—including 
domestic violence, rape, female genital mutilation, and other forms of 
violence.149 The Guidelines were formed through collaboration 
between advocates and government officials,150 attempting to bring 
uniformity and consistency to adjudications by setting forth detailed 
factors for asylum officers to consider.151 Because the Guidelines were 
not mandatory, and were directed only to the complement of asylum 
officers located within USCIS,152 they failed to produce any kind of 
uniformity across all asylum adjudications within the immigration 
courts or the federal court system. Thus, even as the Guidelines were 
“highly normative and influential,”153 they were not binding on 
 
 147. See Anker, supra note 16, at 48. 
 148. Id. at 46.  
 149. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Immigration & Naturalization Servs. Office of Int’l 
Affairs, to All INS Asylum Office 9–16 (May 26, 1995) [hereinafter INS Guidelines] (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). Canada’s 1993 Gender Guidelines served as a model for the 1995 
U.S. guidelines. See Anker, supra note 16, at 54.  
 150. See Anker, supra note 16, at 55.  
 151. See INS Guidelines, supra note 149, at 9–16.  
 152. See Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance 
and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 
REFUGEE SURV. Q. 2, 46, 52 (2010). 
 153. See Anker, supra note 16, at 55.  
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immigration judges or the BIA154 and did not root out disparities in 
adjudications of gender-based claims.155 
The BIA’s 1999 decision in Matter of R-A-156 reflected this lack of 
clarity. In R-A-, the BIA denied asylum to Rody Alvarado, a 
Guatemalan woman who had fled domestic abuse, including brutal 
beatings and rape,157 calling into question whether persecution in the 
form of domestic violence could provide the basis for a successful 
asylum claim.158 Attorney General Janet Reno responded by vacating 
R-A- and ordering the BIA to stay the decision in light of then-
pending DOJ regulations on the topic of gender-based asylum.159 The 
proposed federal regulations, which reinforced that gender could 
form the basis of a “particular social group”160 and provided guidance 
for analyzing domestic-violence claims,161 were never finalized.162 
 
 154. See Musalo, supra note 152, at 52–53.  
 155. Caroline J. O’Neill, Health Is a Human Right: Why the U.S. Immigration Law Response 
to Gender-Based Asylum Claims Requires More Attention to International Human Rights 
Norms, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 241, 242 (2000); see also Lisa C. Chan, Everything 
in Moderation: Why Any Gender Nexus Under U.S. Asylum Law Must Be Strictly Limited in 
Scope, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 169, 172 (2011) (arguing that the INS Guidelines have “failed to 
achieve consistency among immigration officials over how to adjudicate . . . gender-based 
claims”). 
 156. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated and remanded, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
906 (A.G. 2001). 
 157. Id. at 908–09 (describing acts of abuse including the dislocating of the respondent’s 
jawbone, repeated rapes, beatings to unconsciousness, and the throwing of a machete toward 
the respondent’s body). 
 158. Id. As a result, advocates began relying on alternative legal theories, such as political 
opinion or religion, to win asylum claims. Anker, supra note 16, at 56–57. This tactic proved 
effective in In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (B.I.A. 2000), in which the BIA granted asylum on 
account of religion to a Moroccan woman who had been physically abused by her father. Anker, 
supra note 16, at 57. 
 159. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906 (A.G. 2001). These regulations were intended to 
remove “certain barriers that the [In re R-A-] decision seem[ed] to pose.” Asylum and 
Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (Dec. 7, 2000). 
 160. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (noting the requirement that an applicant for 
asylum demonstrate persecution on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion”). 
 161. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76588 (“This rule . . . restates that 
gender can form the basis of a particular social group . . . [and] will aid in the assessment of 
claims made by applicants who have suffered or fear domestic violence.”); see also Department 
of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 5, In re R-A-, 22 I. & 
N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A-
%20DHS%20brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/A94H-H84H] (“DHS expects that the final rule will 
represent the conclusion that, under current law, it is possible for some limited number of 
victims of domestic violence to establish that the harm they suffered or fear is on account of 
membership in a particular social group . . . .”).  
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Instead, DOJ determined that a case-by-case approach “would be 
better than a categorical rule.”163 
R-A- remained pending for almost a decade, and while the BIA 
issued no decisions during that time regarding the cognizability of 
gender- or domestic-violence-based asylum,164 DHS changed its 
position. Although it had appealed the initial grant of asylum to Rody 
Alvarado,165 DHS submitted a brief to the BIA arguing that the Board 
should grant asylum to “married women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave the relationship.”166 DHS argued that by not granting 
asylum based on domestic violence, the BIA “would impede rational, 
coherent development of particular social group law . . . [and] would 
undermine clarity, consistency and fairness in the administration of 
asylum law in general.”167  
While R-A- remained pending, the attorney general again 
intervened. In 2005, John Ashcroft certified R-A- to himself (just as 
Attorney General Reno had done) and ordered the BIA to 
reconsider its decision following the publication of a proposed rule.168 
By 2008, these regulations had still not been finalized, so Attorney 
General Michael Mukasey certified the case to himself, lifted the stay, 
and remanded the case to the BIA for a decision.169 The BIA 
remanded the case to the immigration judge, and in 2009 the 
immigration judge granted Rody Alvarado asylum. 
Although the decision was hailed as a victory, it applied only to 
one individual, offering no precedent for the hundreds of other 
pending cases.170 As a result, advocates turned to “nontraditional” 
 
 162. See Marsden, supra note 69, at 2529 (noting that the regulations were “abandoned after 
George W. Bush took office in 2001”).  
 163. Id. at 2552.  
 164. See Anker, supra note 16, at 57.  
 165. See Musalo, supra note 152, at 58–59.  
 166. Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief, 
supra note 161, at 19. DHS’s limited definition of the particular social group in this case 
reflected a pattern among gender-based asylum applicants to define the group narrowly, given a 
reluctance by courts to accept a definition of particular social group that is too large. See 
Marsden, supra note 69, at 2527 (“Because courts have treated particular social groups that 
hinge only on an applicant’s gender with skepticism, gender-based asylum claims often define 
the particular social group more narrowly to make the group appear smaller.”). 
 167. Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondents Eligibility for Relief supra note 
161, at 15–16.  
 168. In re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005).  
 169. In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).  
 170. Anker, supra note 16, at 57–58. 
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sources of authority to make their arguments,171 including government 
briefs (such as DHS’s brief in R-A-), INS and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) gender guidelines, and more 
recent guidance by USCIS for asylum officers.172 Attorneys drawing 
on such “normative, but subregulatory sources” won cases, which in 
turn “led to greater formalization of these sources.”173 
DHS’s recognition of domestic violence as a basis for asylum 
increased with another domestic-violence case, Matter of L-R-.174 
Once again, as with R-A-, DHS submitted a brief recommending 
asylum based on domestic violence.175 As a result, attorneys who had 
relied on DHS’s brief in R-A- could also rely on its submission in L-
R- as a “de facto statement of agency policy.”176 Moreover, one year 
after L-R- was decided, DHS issued written clarification 
acknowledging that it considered domestic violence a valid basis for 
asylum.177 Despite DHS’s position, the BIA remained silent on 
whether gender could constitute a particular social group and whether 
asylum claims could be based on domestic violence.178 However, in 
2014, the BIA came closer to resolving these issues with its decision in 
Matter of A-R-C-G-.179 
A-R-C-G- concerned a woman who fled Guatemala in 2005 to 
escape the abuse she had suffered at the hands of her husband.180 
When she sought asylum, the immigration judge found that she was 
not eligible because her husband’s acts of abuse, while arbitrary and 
 
 171. Id. at 58.  
 172. See id. at 58. The more recent USCIS guidance, like the INS Guidelines and UNHCR 
guidelines, is neither binding on the agency nor enforceable in court. See ASYLUM DIV., U.S 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE: FEMALE 
ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS 26 (2009), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson
%20Plans/Female-Asylum-Applicants-Gender-Related-Claims-31aug10.pdf [http://perma.cc/
Z2R5-5UMD].  
 173. See Anker, supra note 16, at 53.  
 174. See Department of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief, In re L-R- (B.I.A. Apr. 
13, 2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/DSE3-9V3X]. 
 175. Id. DHS noted that the “delay of over nine years in producing either regulations or an 
authoritative administrative precedent” reflected the challenges presented by domestic-violence 
asylum claims. Id. at 4.  
 176. Anker, supra note 16, at 58.  
 177. Id. at 59.  
 178. Id. 
 179. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).  
 180. Id. at 389.  
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“without reason,” did not constitute “persecution.”181 Noting that 
“cases arising in the context of domestic violence generally involve 
unique and discrete issues not present in other particular social group 
determinations,”182 the BIA recognized, as a particular social group, 
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 
relationship.”183 Although the BIA remanded the case to the 
immigration judge,184 its ruling provided a useful roadmap for future 
successful domestic-violence cases in immigration court. 
There is still no binding rule on domestic violence as a basis for 
asylum, but commentators see “reason . . . for some optimism” 
through the various steps taken throughout varying levels of the 
immigration agencies.185 Owing to the DHS briefs filed in R-A-, L-R-, 
and A-R-C-G-, combined with decisions by individual immigration 
judges and the BIA, litigants are increasingly able to bring successful 
asylum claims on behalf of domestic-violence victims.186 This 
improved state of affairs has been credited to “a legal transformation 
that occurred from the ground up” as well as “a long tradition of 
adjudicators recognizing gender-based persecution and gender-based 
asylum claims.”187 Owing to progress forged on the ground, “there is 
now a ground-level jurisprudence that is having significant impact on 
other aspects of refugee law and decisionmaking institutions including 
at higher levels.”188 
4. Bureaucratic Resistance to Mandatory Detention.  Bottom-up 
agency influences are also evident in the occasional resistance by 
immigration enforcement officers to experimental top-down policies 
that placed unrealistic burdens on the immigration system and 
undermined well-established agency practices. For example, in 2003, 
the newly created DHS established pilot programs in three U.S. cities 
requiring the automatic and immediate detention of all foreign 
 
 181. Id. at 390.  
 182. Id. at 394.  
 183. Id. at 390.  
 184. Id. at 396.  
 185. Anker, supra note 16, at 48. 
 186. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence As A Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case 
Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 143 (2013) 
(“In many cases, judges have accepted the DHS framework and recognized groups that include 
some combination of the L-R- characteristics of gender, nationality, and status in the 
relationship . . . .”).  
 187. Anker, supra note 16, at 67. 
 188. Id. 
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nationals ordered removed by an immigration judge. Although 
foreign nationals are ordinarily not detained upon being ordered 
removed, the newly created Detention After Removal Hearing 
(DARH) program, also known as “Operation Compliance,” required 
automatic detention in all such cases. The policy was short-lived, 
which practitioners attribute to the program’s unpopularity, not only 
among foreign nationals and their attorneys, but also frontline 
officers who enforce immigration law.189 
DHS created DARH in 2003 in an effort to address concerns 
that too many nondetained foreign nationals ordered removed were 
never actually deported.190 News reports consistently quoted an ICE 
statistic that 85 percent of undocumented immigrants abscond; the 
government estimated that there were about 400,000 foreign-national 
fugitives within the United States.191 The DARH program, piloted in 
Hartford192 and later rolled out in Atlanta and Denver, required that 
an ICE detention officer take custody of each and every foreign 
national ordered removed by an immigration judge—regardless of 
whether that person appealed the order.193 DARH also required 
 
 189. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, Immigration Attorney in Private Practice 
(Aug. 17, 2015) (notes on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that frontline prosecutors 
disliked the program and sent their negative feedback up the chain of command); Telephone 
Interview with Anthony Collins, Immigration Attorney in Private Practice (Oct. 7, 2015) (notes 
on file with the Duke Law Journal) (remarking that DARH illustrates how immigration officers 
resist top-down policies that lack buy-in). 
 190. For example, in one year, ICE removed 92 percent of detained foreign nationals but 
had a much lower removal rate of 13 to 35 percent for those who were not detained. 
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DRO OPERATION ORDER 2-03 
(HARTFORD PROJECT) 1 (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter HARTFORD PROJECT DRO OPERATION 
ORDER] (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., DRO OPERATION ORDER 1-04 (ATLANTA PILOT) 1 (Apr. 2004) 
[hereinafter ATLANTA PILOT DRO OPERATION ORDER] (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(citing an effective removal rate of 94 percent for detained foreign nationals but only 11 percent 
for those who were not detained); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
REP. NO. I-2003-004, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE’S REMOVAL OF 
ALIENS ISSUED FINAL ORDERS 11 (Feb. 2003), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/INS/e0304/
final.pdf [http://perma.cc/WC2R-KBEP] (citing an effective removal rate of 92 percent for 
detained foreign nationals but only 13 percent for those who were not detained and noting this 
low rate of removal existed despite corrective actions recommended years earlier). 
 191. See Bruce Finley, In New Push, Deportees Will be Jailed at Once, Efforts to Cut 
Absconders Expands to Denver, DENVER POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at A1; Press Release, U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, ICE Expands Pilot Project to Detain Deportable Aliens (Mar. 
26, 2004). 
 192. The first program debuted in Hartford, Connecticut from August 12, 2003 through 
October 12, 2003. See Hartford Pilot Project Briefing Paper (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(provided in response to FOIA request).  
 193. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, supra note 191.  
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removal for foreign nationals who, while not ordered removed, were 
granted voluntary departure with a condition of posting bond.194 Once 
the judge issued a removal order or granted voluntary departure with 
a condition of posting bond, the foreign national would be taken into 
custody immediately.195 
The DARH program marked a dramatic shift from prior 
enforcement policies in which ICE “refrained from making arrests at 
immigration courts due to a lack of detention capacity and the 
resistance of the private bar and advocates who maintain that regular 
arrests at the courts will deter many aliens from showing up for 
hearings.”196 Absent exceptional cases in which a foreign national was 
a danger to the community or a flight risk, detention was generally 
not imposed until all administrative appeals had been exhausted.197 
DARH changed the status quo by placing an Office of Detention and 
Removal (DRO) officer in every courtroom;198 once in custody, ICE 
revoked any previous bond. The foreign national could apply for 
bond again, but bond amounts could soar higher than $200,000.199 
Unless released by DRO or the immigration judge, a foreign national 
ordered removed was detained until the proceedings were 
administratively final, or he or she was removed.200 
 
 194. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: ICE’S 
DETENTION AFTER REMOVAL HEARING (DARH) PROGRAM 1 (Apr. 9, 2004), http://american
immigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/lac_pa_041204.pdf [http://perma.cc/8QQL-PNSM]. 
Voluntary departure is defined as “[t]he departure of an alien from the United States without an 
order of removal. The departure may or may not have been preceded by a hearing before an 
immigration judge. An alien allowed to voluntarily depart concedes removability but does not 
have a bar to seeking admission at a port-of-entry at any time.” Voluntary Departure, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/voluntary-departure 
[http://perma.cc/RWF4-NNMT]. 
 195. See Memorandum from Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, EOIR, to Detention 
and Removal Operations, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. app. At 1 (Mar. 26, 2004) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (provided in response to a FOIA request).  
 196. See ATLANTA PILOT DRO OPERATION ORDER, supra note 190, at 1.  
 197. See id. at 2 (noting that the target population for the program were those ordered 
removed “on the non-detained docket” who lacked a criminal conviction or had been convicted 
solely of a minor crime); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Foreigners Fighting Orders to Leave U.S. 
May Face Jail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at A28; Matt Apuzzo, Illegal Immigrants in 
Connecticut Arrested Before Appeals as Part of Homeland Security Pilot Program, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Sept. 16, 2003.  
 198. See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 197, at A28; Memorandum from Dir., Office of Det. 
and Removal, to Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 27, 2003) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal).  
 199. See Hartford Pilot Project Briefing Paper, supra note 192, at 1 (noting that bonds 
ranged “from $5,000 to more than $200,000”).  
 200. Id. 
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DARH was part of a larger effort by DHS called “Endgame,”201 a 
ten-year strategic plan created by DRO to try and reduce the number 
of fugitive foreign nationals. It was composed of the DARH program, 
the electronic-monitoring-device program (which placed an electronic 
monitoring device on nondetained foreign nationals to track them 
while awaiting removal), and a telephone-reporting program.202 
The Hartford pilot program was short-lived, and there is very 
little reporting about the policy or its demise.203 However, 
immigration attorneys have attributed its fall to resistance from both 
the private bar as well as from some within DHS.204 According to 
Michael Boyle, an attorney in North Haven, Connecticut, DHS trial 
attorneys abhorred the program and wanted it to end. Boyle also 
observed that government prosecutors preferred to spend time on 
heavy-duty enforcement efforts, defying DARH in more run-of-the-
mill cases.205 Anthony Collins, another local attorney practicing during 
the time of DARH, noted that the policy was especially punitive in 
cases in which immigrants ordered removed had viable grounds for an 
appeal and faced detention and separation from their families before 
their appeal could be heard.206 Practicing attorneys also remarked that 
the potential consequence of prolonged detention chilled some 
foreign nationals from seeking various benefits or other forms of 
immigration relief in the first place.207  
Immigration judges would respond to DARH by holding bond 
hearings immediately at the conclusion of a merits hearing so that a 
foreign national ordered detained would not necessarily be placed in 
custody during the interim between the merits and bond hearings.208 
On occasion, DHS attorneys appeared willing to use what little 
 
 201. Teresa Borden, Q&A/John Mata, U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs: ‘80,000 
Criminal Aliens Are Roaming Our Streets’, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 1, 2004, at F3.  
 202. Id. 
 203. See ATLANTA PILOT DRO OPERATION ORDER, supra note 190, at 1 (noting that “[t]he 
Hartford Project took place over a period of sixty days”). Following the conclusion of the 
Hartford pilot program, DHS piloted DARH in Denver, Colorado, and Atlanta, Georgia, from 
April 2004 to August 31, 2004. See id. at 3; Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 
supra note 191. As in the case of Hartford, the government never made these programs 
permanent.  
 204. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, supra note 189. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Telephone Interview with Anthony Collins, supra note 189.  
 207. Id.; Telephone Interview with Joseph Tapper, Immigration Attorney in Private Practice 
(Oct. 9, 2015) (notes on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 208. Telephone Interview with Anthony Collins, supra note 189. 
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discretion they had to spare foreign nationals the program’s harsh 
consequence. Collins recalls one particularly sympathetic case 
involving a Polish immigrant who faced technical hurdles to getting 
relief. In that case, the DHS trial attorney took the unusual step of 
consenting to a continuance so that the foreign national would not be 
subject to mandatory detention.209 Continuances in that court were 
exceedingly rare during this time, but the trial attorney’s consent 
provided a reprieve long enough to outlast the DARH program.210 
DARH faced additional, practical hurdles as well. ICE had 
limited bed space and would prioritize those with criminal records;211 
requiring automatic detention of noncriminal cases threatened to 
overwhelm immigration-detention facilities.212 Moreover, in Hartford, 
the nearest detention centers were fairly far away from the 
immigration court,213 creating additional work for deportation officers 
and making it hard for ICE officers to comply. The program also 
raised concerns for the effects it would have on more vulnerable 
asylum-seekers.214 
Given how little information exists on the DARH program, one 
can only speculate why it never matured into the program some 
within the Bush administration imagined it would become. But 
members of the immigration bar believe that feedback being sent up 
the chain was negative and that the program failed because it lacked 
buy-in from the agency’s own long-term experts.215 Thus, to the extent 
there were concerns that DARH would become national policy, 
practitioners took some solace “when prosecutors were telling us 
[that DARH] was a nightmare for them and for the judges too.”216 
C. Executive Deferred Action and Bottom-Up Innovation 
The correlations between frontline exercises of case-by-case 
discretion and certain across-the-board policies raise the question 
whether the more recent executive branch programs, DACA and 
 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 197, at A28. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, supra note 189 (noting that the two closest 
facilities were in Greenfield, Massachusetts, and Wyatt, Rhode Island).  
 214. Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 197.  
 215. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, supra note 189; Telephone Interview with 
Anthony Collins, supra note 189. 
 216. Telephone Interview with Michael Boyle, supra note 189.  
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DAPA, have similar relationships with individual decisions on the 
ground. Interestingly, a number of recent empirical studies suggest 
that such correlations may exist.217 Shoba Wadhia’s analysis of 
deferred action cases processed by ICE field offices from October 
2011 through June 2012 demonstrates that two of the three most 
common factors for a favorable grant—“having a [U.S-citizen] 
dependent [] or being an individual in the United States since 
childhood”218—are the same criteria for DACA and DAPA, which 
prevent family separation through the deportation of foreign 
nationals who arrived as children and the undocumented parents of 
U.S.-citizen and LPR children.219 A study by Leon Wildes of deferred 
action statistics from USCIS reveals similar results. Although the 
Wildes study is much older, it notes that two of the three most 
common factors for granting deferred action were to protect foreign-
national youths and to prevent the separation of families.220 
To be sure, DACA and DAPA are clearly a result of 
decisionmaking by high-level officials, responding in part to other 
high-level influences and pressures to find ways to avoid deporting 
DREAMers and other foreign nationals who have long resided in the 
United States and to focus resources on criminal offenders instead. 
Indeed, one could argue that DACA and DAPA would have been 
adopted regardless of how frontline agents, acting on their own, had 
chosen to exercise discretion in individual cases. Yet these empirical 
studies reinforce the idea that ground-level decisions could bear on 
across-the-board deferred action programs; more positively, 
categorical executive policy could even be rooted in case-by-case 
discretionary exercises by longtime agency experts who enforce the 
law on a daily basis.221 
The inquiry into correlations between case-by-case exercises and 
categorical policy also helps shore up a vague dividing line between 
supposedly legitimate and illegitimate uses of deferred action. For 
example, a November 2014 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
memorandum that provides reinforcement for two of three proposed 
DHS policies adamantly rejects expanding categorical deferred action 
 
 217. See, e.g., Wadhia, Great FOIA Adventure, supra note 32, at 369; Wadhia, Sharing 
Secrets, supra note 55, at 6; Wildes, supra note 32, at 830.  
 218. Wadhia, Great FOIA Adventure, supra note 32, at 369. 
 219. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 220. Wildes, supra note 32, at 830.  
 221. See infra Part IV.A. 
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to the parents of DACA recipients.222 In its support of DAPA, the 
OLC opinion makes traditional separation-of-powers arguments 
couched in congressional acquiescence to administration policy.223 For 
example, it highlights, as a basis for vindicating DAPA, a 
longstanding agency policy of prioritizing removal of particular 
categories of foreign nationals without any apparent objection from 
Congress.224 Yet, where the parents of DACA recipients are 
concerned, OLC was “aware of no precedent for using deferred 
action in this way,”225 concluding that this category of individuals 
would be “unlike prior deferred action programs in which Congress 
has acquiesced.”226 
Nevertheless, the memorandum offered the suggestion that its 
conclusion regarding categorical determinations for the parents of 
DACA recipients might shift if case-by-case discretionary decisions 
pointed to an established practice of protecting such individuals: 
DHS, of course, remains free to consider whether to grant deferred 
action to individual parents of DACA recipients on an ad hoc basis. 
But in the absence of clearer indications that the proposed class-
based deferred action program for DACA parents would be 
consistent with the congressional policies and priorities embodied in 
the immigration laws, we conclude that it would not be 
permissible.227 
This statement, however enigmatic, could provide support for the 
idea that future executive deferred action programs might be 
legitimated by a groundswell of similar case-by-case determinations 
on the ground. Although there is little empirical evidence at this time 
that favorable exercises of discretion have been routinely granted to 
individuals with non-U.S.-citizen or non-LPR dependents, such a 
 
 222. See OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at 31–33. 
 223. See id. at 23 (“[P]erhaps the clearest indication that these features of deferred action 
programs are not per se impermissible is the fact that Congress, aware of these features, has 
repeatedly enacted legislation appearing to endorse such programs.”).  
 224. Id. at 7–8 (“In their exercise of enforcement discretion, DHS and its predecessor, INS, 
have long employed guidance instructing immigration officers to prioritize the enforcement of 
the immigration laws against certain categories of aliens and to deprioritize their enforcement 
against others.”).  
 225. Id. at 33. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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practice could emerge.228 Ground-level “deferred action decisions are 
not limited to the presence or absence of a dependent with lawful 
status,”229 and the development of case-by-case agency precedent for 
the parents of DACA recipients could lay a foundation for similar 
categorical action in the future. 
IV.  DISCRETION AND AGENCY “COMMON LAW” 
Although the Obama administration’s use of categorical 
enforcement discretion has brought renewed attention to 
prosecutorial discretion,230 the availability of immigration 
enforcement discretion is well established in decades of memoranda 
issued to the field.231 Though these memoranda lack the procedures 
associated with notice-and-comment rulemaking, they do not entirely 
lack the features of agency “precedent.” Frontline discretion has a 
long pedigree within the immigration agencies, with increasingly 
open-ended criteria underlying favorable exercises of discretion.232 To 
the extent that case-by-case exercises of discretion crowd around 
certain common themes, those exercises of discretion can contribute 
to the development of agency understandings, or best practices, which 
in turn guide future enforcement decisions. Moreover, the 
congruence between lower-level exercises of discretion and across-
the-board agency policy could be a basis for vindicating categorical 
executive action. Thus, rather than uphold (or invalidate) executive 
deferred action programs exclusively through a formalistic reading of 
Chevron,233 or seek to exempt enforcement policies from judicial 
 
 228. As Shoba Wadhia has noted, grants of deferred action to individuals without a U.S.-
citizen dependent have thus far focused primarily on those individuals who serve as primary 
caregivers to individuals with a serious physical or mental illness. See Wadhia, Great FOIA 
Adventure, supra note 32, at 369. 
 229. Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar & Clinical 
Professor of Law, Pa. State Dickinson Sch. of Law et al. to President Barack Obama 2 (Nov. 3, 
2014), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/WHLetterFinalNovember20142.
pdf [http://perma.cc/UCX5-HBM9].  
 230. See supra notes 1–3, 7–8 and accompanying text.  
 231. See supra Part II.B. 
 232. See supra Part II.B.  
 233. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(requiring deference to reasonable agency interpretations of vague statutory language); 
Compare Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178–86 (5th Cir. 2015) (using the Chevron 
framework to enjoin the 2014 deferred action initiatives as “manifestly contrary” to, and an 
unreasonable interpretation of, the INA), cert. granted, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257 (U.S. Jan. 
19, 2016), with id. at 215–18 (King, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s decision to 
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review altogether,234 courts might analyze executive branch policy 
through the alternative source of frontline enforcement. Such an 
analysis, grounded in expertise rather than political accountability, is 
a bedrock justification for the administrative process and a well-
established, if undervalued, doctrinal basis for judicial deference.235 
On this account, the reviewing court would consider, among other 
things, whether a particular executive policy being challenged was 
supported by frontline enforcement decisions on the ground. Indeed, 
there already is some evidence that the Supreme Court applies these 
more functionalist frameworks to review the legitimacy of 
administrative action.236 In short, the relationship between top-down 
decisions and more ordinary manifestations in the field could be a 
basis for thinking about the legitimacy of across-the-board 
enforcement policies.237 
A. Enforcement, Longstanding Practice, and Deference 
The broad range of considerations spelled out in agency field 
memoranda have not prevented frontline enforcement decisions from 
crowding around certain specific factors—in particular, hardship 
caused by separating families and removing foreign-national youths.238 
Not only have frontline officers taken a lead role in deciding which 
kinds of cases can be most worthy of prosecutorial discretion, but 
exercises of discretion have helped create new forms of deportation 
relief. Indeed, deferred action itself emerged from local practice—not 
statutory authorization—something OLC noted in its opinion lending 
 
address the substantive APA issue but finding, in any event, that the programs would not 
violate Chevron).  
 234. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding “that an agency’s decision not 
to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally 
committed to an agency’s absolute discretion”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, 20–21, 
United States v. Texas, 2015 WL 7308179 (Nov. 20, 2015) (No. 15-674) (invoking Heckler as a 
basis to legitimate the 2014 reforms). 
 235. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990) (noting that 
“practical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference”); 
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (noting that “administrative judgments are 
entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts” when they are “the product of 
administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the 
statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts”). 
 236. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.  
 237. See supra Part III.C. 
 238. See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text. 
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support for DAPA.239 Thus, there are good reasons to look to 
frontline enforcement as a basis for bottom-up innovation. Case-by-
case decisions could be harnessed to identify certain new and 
previously overlooked categories of immigrants deserving relief—not 
to mention novel ways of protecting them. Once these lower-level 
experiments reach a saturation point, they may provide justificatory 
support for higher-level, across-the-board agency action. 
The wide availability of ground-level discretion, combined with 
added possibilities for vibrant exchange between those at the highest 
and lowest echelons of the agency, could imbue top-down decisions 
with a stronger basis in agency expertise, which in turn enhances the 
durability of across-the-board executive programs. Because the 
“bureaucracy creates a civil service not beholden to any particular 
administration and a cadre of experts with a long-term institutional 
worldview,”240 increased coordination between higher-level officials 
and lower-level officers could supply executive enforcement policies 
with greater doctrinal and normative backing. Although the technical 
expertise of long time agency bureaucrats has hardly figured into the 
legal and scholarly debates regarding across-the-board enforcement 
policies such as DACA and DAPA, it seems only reasonable to look 
to ground-level enforcement for insights into whether the Obama 
administration’s policies are supported by the kind of technical 
specialization and expertise that are a bedrock of ordinary deference 
doctrines.241 
The OLC opinion discussed in Part III endorses this expertise-
based rationale.242 The opinion makes clear that “any expansion of 
deferred action to new classes of aliens must be carefully scrutinized 
to ensure that it reflects considerations within the agency’s 
expertise.”243 Moreover, as previously mentioned, the opinion, in its 
brief section finding unacceptable a policy protecting the parents of 
DACA recipients, appears to draw connections between favorable 
 
 239. As OLC noted, “[a]lthough the practice of granting deferred action ‘developed without 
express statutory authorization,’ it has become a regular feature of the immigration removal 
system that has been acknowledged by both Congress and the Supreme Court.” OLC Opinion, 
supra note 55, at 13 (citation omitted).  
 240. Katyal, supra note 6, at 2317. 
 241. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to 
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 106 (2006) (“Historically, when courts decide whether to award 
deference to an executive interpretation, they have considered three factors: expertise, whether 
there has been a delegation from Congress, and political accountability.”). 
 242. See supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text.  
 243. OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at 24. 
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exercises of discretion in discrete cases and categorical executive 
policies.244 The opinion also makes repeated references to the 
importance of preserving “case-by-case determinations about 
whether an individual alien’s circumstances warrant the expenditure 
of removal resources.”245 
A more full-throated argument linking bureaucratic expertise 
with individual enforcement decisions can be found within Arizona v. 
United States,246 which highlights the critical role of individual 
enforcement decisions as a basis for deference. Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion provides a subtle portrayal of the bureaucrat-as-
expert, explicitly recognizing the significance of discretion in discrete 
cases: 
A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion 
exercised by immigration officials. Federal officials, as an initial 
matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at 
all. . . . ICE officers are responsible “for the identification, 
apprehension, and removal of illegal aliens in the United States.”247 
The Court’s recent treatment of immigration enforcement discretion 
thus supports incorporating lower-level influences in considerations 
of agency expertise.248 
Although Arizona’s discussion of executive discretion emerges in 
the federalism context, its functionalist, expertise-based account of 
deference converges with other, similar administrative-law decisions 
of late that deviate from a formal, accountability-based theory of 
deference to agency determinations.249 It is beyond the scope of this 
 
 244. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 245. See, e.g., OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at 11. 
 246. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). Arizona held that three provisions of 
an Arizona law tying criminal penalties to federal immigration policies were preempted by 
federal law because of Congress’s occupation of the field. See id. at 2501–07. The Court upheld 
one portion of the law requiring state officers to make a reasonable effort to determine the 
immigration status of a detainee when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
person is unlawfully present in the United States. See id. at 2507–10. 
 247. Id. at 2499–500 (citations omitted) (quoting OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 2 (2011)).  
 248. Cf. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 132 (pointing out that recent changes in 
immigration law “have simply moved the power to provide relief to the arrest and charging 
phase, shifting the judgment from immigration judges to prosecutors and immigration police”). 
 249. See generally Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917 (2012) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s preference for Justice Jackson’s functionalist Youngstown 
framework over bright-line invocations of Chevron in a range of administrative-law contexts, 
with a focus on national-security cases); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The 
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Article to engage in a full analysis of the interplay between these 
recent doctrinal developments and an expertise-based model of 
agency policy grounded in routine administrative practices—a topic 
for future scholarship. But the idea of analyzing the connections 
between across-the-board agency policy and frontline exercises of 
discretion in discrete cases could be important to preserving the 
vitality of executive deferred action policies—an important matter 
given the Supreme Court’s decision to review the 2014 reforms 
around DAPA and expanded DACA.250 In a doctrinal field saturated 
with puzzling deference doctrines, a theory of agency buy-in could be 
vital to the preservation of administrative policies. 
In short, bureaucratic buy-in could supply DACA and DAPA 
with an added—and needed—measure of legitimacy. Indeed, 
presidential administrations should not refrain from touting the 
extent to which across-the-board enforcement policies are consistent 
not only with decades of agency guidelines, but also enforcement 
decisions rendered on the ground. In noting the way that frontline 
exercises of discretion coalesce around certain specific factors, 
presidential administrations can maintain that categorical 
policymaking provides a curative to inequities on the ground—
bringing all frontline enforcement into alignment with emerging best 
practices. In the same way that congressional findings and legislative 
history might help shore up vague statutory text, ground-level agency 
decisions that accumulate over time could provide support for 
executive branch policies that protect entire categories of individuals. 
B. Agency Experimentation and “Common Law” 
Administrative-law theorists have observed that “creativity is 
impossible without discretion.”251 Legislatures identify problems, but 
administrative agents do the hard work of deriving solutions. In a 
seminal volume on administrative law and justice, Kenneth Culp 
Davis provided the following description of the role of the 
bureaucratic agent: 
 
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1179 (2008) (“[S]tatutory subject matter and 
institutional context appear to be more important in the Justices’ own evaluation of agency 
inputs than the rhetorical ‘deference’ regime the Justices attach to the case.”).  
 250. United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016). 
 251. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 20 
(1969). 
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[T]he delegate, through case-to-case consideration, where the 
human mind is often at its best, nibbles at the problem and finds 
little solutions for each little bite of the big problem. Creativeness in 
the nibbling sometimes opens the way for perspective thinking 
about the whole big problem, and large solutions sometimes 
emerge.252 
As frontline immigration officers begin to converge on shared 
discretionary decisions—whether for the partners and spouses of gay 
and lesbian U.S. citizens and LPRs253 or the family members of U.S.-
citizen military personnel254—those decisions, over time, contribute to 
a process of legal development that can be analogized to “the creation 
of [agency] common law.”255 And as much as the analogy to a 
common-law or quasi-common-law process could help to provide a 
doctrinal foundation for top-down executive action, it also serves as a 
practical basis for novel instances of categorical executive policy. 
The phrase “administrative common law” generally refers to 
judicially created doctrines of administrative law and procedural 
review,256 but it relates to internal agency practices as well.257 Under 
the conventional literature,258 the “common law” aspects of judicial 
review of administrative law include a judge-centric adjudicative 
process that develops the doctrinal framework incrementally with a 
noted reliance on precedent—a kind of stare decisis for 
administrative-law adjudications.259 But the term “administrative 
common law” also can be said to refer to the incremental 
development of law and policy within the executive branch, by 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 254. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 255. DAVIS, supra note 251, at 21. 
 256. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2012).  
 257. See Davidson & Leib, supra note 44, at 262 (discussing the idea of administrative 
common law in the context of OIRA’s lawmaking functions). 
 258. Commentators traditionally conceive of administrative common law as a byproduct of 
federal appellate review of administrative-law adjudications. As Gillian Metzger notes, many 
administrative-law doctrines are “judicially created at their core,” with the development of 
Chevron deference for reviewing agency statutory interpretations a “central example.” See 
Metzger, supra note 256, at 1299; see also Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in 
Administrative Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 21 (2011) (“[The Chevron] doctrine is the 
quintessential common law creation.”); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial 
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189 (1998) (referring to Chevron as “[t]he most important opinion 
in administrative common law”).  
 259. Metzger, supra note 256, at 1313. 
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administrative agencies themselves.260 This idea of administrative 
common law usually concerns the development of agency action—
mainly through agency adjudication—that produces a law common to 
the agency.261 
If, as Cass Sunstein has declared, “agencies have become modern 
America’s common law courts,”262 the conception of administrative 
common law might also describe the incremental development of 
agency decisionmaking, whether through adjudication or enforcement 
practices. Importing the concepts of administrative common law from 
the judicial review context to internal agency practices can provide 
the latter with a more “evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles [that] contributes to the actual and 
perceived integrity of the [administrative] process.”263 If 
“administrative agencies [have] displace[d] the previously central role 
of federal courts in the making of federal common law,”264 the 
iterative process of agency decisionmaking, including enforcement 
decisions, merits attention—especially given the nonreviewability of 
frontline enforcement decisions.265 These enforcement determinations 
 
 260. See id. at 1295 n.1 (“The term ‘administrative common law’ is also sometimes used to 
refer to common law created by agencies, for example through adjudication . . . .”); see also 
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 693 
(2005) (“To some extent, administrative policymaking is similar to judicial lawmaking in the 
general common-law system.”). 
 261. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 
47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998) (“Operating as common law courts, agencies have, as they 
should, considerable power to adapt statutory language to changing understandings and 
circumstances.”). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 
917, 927 (2006) (citations omitted). As Murphy has argued, “[t]he persistence of this theme in 
administrative law is not surprising. The idea that past practices constrain the present—both to 
limit the scope of arbitrary official discretion and to ensure equal treatment of persons over 
time—is old and powerful.” Id. at 932. Given that “the vast bulk of agency interpretations are 
issued through myriad non-legislative means such as formal adjudications, opinion letters, and 
manuals,” id. at 933, presidential measures on the scale of DACA and DAPA may be as much 
about bringing procedural consistency to long time agency practices as striking out new 
legislative ground.  
 264. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement 
of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1719 (2001). 
 265. Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 286–92 (noting the “Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to permit judicial review over prosecutorial discretion”); see also Reno v. 
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–92 (1999) (citing Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985)) (upholding broad executive branch enforcement discretion 
despite claims that prosecutorial discretion was used in a discriminatory manner).  
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can reveal insights into an internal body of common customs or 
conventions reflecting longtime agency practices.266 
Under this theory of administrative common law, decisions by 
frontline officers and agency staff, and the broader policies 
incorporated in agency memoranda,267 incrementally help to develop a 
culture, and—eventually—a body of precedent that is persuasive, 
though not binding, on the higher ranks. Such lower-level exercises 
provide information regarding uses of discretion that contribute 
incrementally to the development of longstanding agency policy, a 
bedrock of the common-law tradition.268 This process is most 
pronounced in agency settings characterized by widely delegated 
prosecutorial discretion—a hallmark of federal immigration 
enforcement.269 Rather than mechanistically applying codified criteria, 
the presence of a more open-ended enforcement standard 
memorialized in longstanding agency practices allows immigration 
officers to find in the existing guidelines ways of interpreting the 
individual facts of a given case to novel ends. The enforcement 
decisions that spring from these exercises of discretion are generally 
grounded in a routine (and often long-term) exposure to immigration-
law issues,270 an expertise formed through repeated exposure to 
 
 266. See Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 32, 60–61 (D.D.C. 1998) (referring 
to “rules implicit in an agency’s course of conduct where that conduct gives rise to a ‘common 
law’ administrative rule”); see also Davidson & Leib, supra note 44, at 274 (noting that 
traditional “modes of stare decisis do not exhaust the possibilities for thinking about how to 
reason from precedent” and “that stare decisis can carry several meanings within the Executive 
Branch . . . . Calibrating the right mix of precedent, reason-giving, and transparency is all on the 
agenda for regleprudence”).  
 267. See supra Part II.B. 
 268. Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have identified this administrative common-law 
process at work in the development of federal privacy law at the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 619–27 (2014). In enforcement actions at the FTC, agency 
actors employ settlement agreements and consent decrees, nonadjudicative resolutions, as a 
body of precedent that functions much like a body of common-law precedent. See id. The 
highest level of decision makers at the FTC, the commissioners themselves, control this 
formulation of administrative common law by formulating and voting on these settlements and 
consent orders. Id. In this way, an administrative common law of privacy is incrementally 
developed in a nonadjudicative setting from the top-down. 
 269. Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 57, at 246–65 (describing the history of 
prosecutorial discretion in frontline immigration enforcement). 
 270. Cf. James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 
363, 376 (1976) (“The continuing expertness of an administrative agency as to matters of 
technical substance can be more properly understood as deriving primarily from its staff.”). 
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“similar matters over and over again.”271 Over time, as favorable 
exercises of case-by-case discretion gravitate toward the periphery of 
pre-established criteria, these seemingly boundary-line cases, upon 
reaching saturation, become a new body of agency precedent.272 As 
lower-level officers slowly create a body of law common to the 
agency, their work provides not only doctrinal support for executive 
action, but a broader form of legitimacy rooted in the expertise of 
lower-level day-to-day enforcement. 
Current immigration structures lack any formal mechanisms that 
allow frontline experiments to filter up to the highest levels of the 
executive and inform policy on a national scale; put another way, 
immigration agencies lack the kind of constant interplay between 
lower-level laboratories and higher-level adaptation associated with 
“experimentalist” regimes.273 Nevertheless, the agency could adopt 
practices that would greatly improve the possibilities for higher-level 
officials to seek input from frontline officers. This Article’s conclusion 
suggests reforms that would enhance opportunities for dialogue 
between higher-level officials and lower-level officers based on the 
latter’s use of discretion in their daily enforcement of immigration 
law. 
V.  THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF BOTTOM-UP INNOVATION 
Lower-level exercises of discretion, and the variances to which 
they give rise, raise a number of normative concerns about procedural 
regularity. After all, novel exercises of lower-level bureaucratic 
discretion, notwithstanding their potential benefits, will almost 
certainly produce large discrepancies in frontline implementation—
with wild inconsistencies, a lack of transparency, and other inequities 
that undermine important procedural values such as evenhandedness, 
interpretive consistency, and transparency.274 Moreover, because 
 
 271. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An 
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1484–85 (2009). 
 272. To borrow from a different constitutional context, agency practices could be vindicated 
by their rootedness in “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 273. See supra notes 18, 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 274. The gender-based asylum case study, see supra Part III.B.3, highlights these sorts of 
difficulties. For years, gender-based asylum cases languished in a sea of inconsistent rules, 
opinions, and guidance documents. The 1995 Guidelines had no binding effect on any of the 
adjudicatory bodies handling gender-based claims—producing wildly different outcomes. And 
LANDAU IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2016  10:28 PM 
1230 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1173 
frontline discretion is not subject to judicial review,275 only top-down 
and across-the-board interventions ensure equity in law 
administration and application. Indeed, even a common practice that 
generally enjoys a longstanding history will, without categorical 
implementation, be applied unevenly on the ground. This problem—
one that scholars have appropriately sought to remedy—has 
produced calls for various kinds of administrative-law solutions. But, 
while top-down decisionmaking remains critical—both to bring equity 
to lower-level enforcement decisions and to supervise officers who do 
not make proper use of enforcement discretion—the mechanisms 
some have proposed could stifle the immediate and long-term 
benefits that lower-level experimentation and bottom-up innovation 
could have for the agency as a whole. 
A. The Benefits of Top-Down Solutions—and Their Limits 
Empirical research has documented the variances of lower-level 
discretion—including problems in which “seemingly eligible 
applicants are denied and less worthy cases are granted deferred 
action status.”276 Wadhia’s 2013 analysis of ICE’s deferred action 
enforcement discretion demonstrated significant disparities in the 
outcome of deferred action decisions across ICE’s twenty-four 
Enforcement and Removal Operations field offices.277 These 
discrepancies have prompted scholars to advocate top-down solutions 
as a mechanism for controlling inconsistencies and other rule-of-law 
problems that are inherent to decentralized enforcement regimes. 
Wadhia has argued that deferred action policy should be embodied 
within agency regulations promulgated under notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, promoting values such as “transparency, consistency, 
acceptability, and accountability.”278 Wildes has made a similar 
 
DHS’s litigation position in the R-A- and L-R- briefs were hardly binding within the rest of 
DHS, leaving gender-based asylum on unsteady legal footing. Although A-R-C-G- has been 
hailed as a victory, the lack of consistent, top-down guidance for gender-based asylum plagued 
that issue, creating a “vacuum in the formal law as it related to domestic violence claims.” 
Anker, supra note 16, at 58. 
 275. See supra note 265. 
 276. Wildes, supra note 32, at 837–38. For a discussion of the distressing variances in asylum 
adjudications, see generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, 
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007). 
 277. Wadhia, Great FOIA Adventure, supra note 32, at 370–73. 
 278. Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 55, at 60–61. 
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argument.279 Instituting agency regulations for the exercises of 
deferred action would indeed serve the goal of reducing these 
disparities and treating like cases alike. 
These calls for regulatory action echo prior ones, including Colin 
Diver’s early criticism of legacy INS’s refusal to codify existing 
standards for exercising discretion in the related arena of adjustment 
of status applications.280 Indeed, legacy INS had proposed regulations 
to govern the wide discretion in that analogous context,281 but the 
process was rescinded in 1981 during the changeover to the Reagan 
administration.282 The agency explained that it was withdrawing the 
proposed rule because it could not “foresee and enumerate all the 
favorable or adverse factors which may be relevant and should be 
considered in the exercise of administrative discretion.”283 The 
concern was that codification might preclude the use of discretion in 
new and previously unanticipated situations: “Listing some factors, 
even with the caveat that such list is not all inclusive, poses a danger 
that use of guidelines may become so rigid as to amount to an abuse 
of discretion.”284 
From this perspective, the Obama administration’s deferred 
action programs, although not a product of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, are still a vast improvement in the way they bring 
uniformity and consistency to certain enforcement decisions. Indeed, 
scholars have hailed the Obama administration for bringing greater 
transparency and predictability to its enforcement policies. Cox and 
Rodríguez praise programs such as DACA and DAPA for making 
“the exercise of discretion more rule-like, centralized, and 
transparent.”285 And they commend the “substitution of delegated and 
 
 279. Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: Internal Guides 
or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 106 (1980) (arguing that the prosecutorial-
discretion guidelines “should probably be subject to the notice and publication requirements of 
the Administrative Procedure Act”). 
 280. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 92–97 
(1983). 
 281. Id. at 93. 
 282. Id. at 94.  
 283. Id.  
 284. Id. Diver argued that the agency’s stated rationale was a smokescreen for fears of 
increased litigation that would arise in the wake of substantive regulations. Id. (“At least the 
Service is consistent: its explanations are no more transparent than its rules. In order to fathom 
the rejection of the proposed rule, we must look behind the official explanation. Several INS 
district officials feared increased litigation.”).  
 285. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 111. 
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visible authority for discretionary and opaque authority.”286 In the 
case of DACA, Andrias argues that the Obama administration’s 
disclosure of its legal rationale promoted transparency and 
accountability through public monitoring.287 
Yet the same argument for transparency that supposedly affirms 
the Obama administration’s policies could sink them as well. First, 
scholars of administrative law have raised concerns about the 
replacement of notice-and-comment rulemaking with subregulatory 
or nonlegislative rules,288 and a federal district court has halted the 
2014 programs nationwide, based on the legal conclusion that the 
Obama administration failed to subject them to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.289 Thus, transparency alone may not be sufficient to 
infuse programs like DACA and DAPA with rule-of-law content. 
Moreover, transparency is not a one-way ratchet, and a presidential 
administration could, in the name of “transparency” or “consistency,” 
produce a set of very different, immigrant-unfriendly directives as 
opposed to the current, more immigrant-affirming ones. 
Scholars also have cited Arizona v. United States as vindication 
for top-down executive deferred action initiatives.290 Yet Arizona is 
not singularly focused on categorical executive policy. Rather, its 
portrayal of prosecutorial discretion is remarkably nuanced, focusing 
largely on immigration enforcement through the lens of discrete cases 
and decisions by immigration officials rather than categorical 
policies.291 
This discussion raises the broader question whether solutions 
grounded entirely within the upper echelons of the executive always 
provide the best mechanism for innovating administrative policy. The 
president can use his appointment-and-removal powers to politicize 
 
 286. Id. at 118; see also id. at 135–36 (“The Administration’s enforcement policy as a whole 
has become increasingly directed at regularizing and making more consistent . . . a system 
executive leadership came to see as too random and overly subject to the views of low-level 
bureaucrats and state and local officials.”). 
 287. See Andrias, supra note 2, at 1089–90, 1118.  
 288. For a discussion of the concerns attending alternatives to substantive rulemaking 
procedures, see, for example, Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of 
Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 579–85 (2012) (recounting the debate over 
nonlegislative rules). 
 289. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 290. Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 64 (2015) (statement of Prof. Stephen H. Legomsky); 
Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 133–34, 145 n.119, 205. 
 291. See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. 
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the bureaucracy, exercise control through Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) via budgetary decisions, and influence agency 
rulemaking through OIRA review.292 But these are blunt tools that 
are rife with structural obstacles, principal-agent problems, and 
pragmatic hurdles to effective governance.293 Appointments require 
the selection of candidates who will remain loyal to the president’s 
policy preferences and are subject to “countervailing legislative 
pressures” derived from the Senate’s advice-and-consent powers.294 
Budgetary control and OIRA review can push the bureaucracy 
toward certain policy goals, but both may be too blunt to adequately 
institute policy change, especially where the president seeks to 
influence how lower-level officers exercise their enforcement 
discretion.295 At base, each of these mechanisms of top-down control 
requires that the president choose between anticipating (and 
avoiding) policy problems before they arise or fixing them after they 
occur. Both tools may be too imprecise to accomplish such goals. 
Although top-down control is a useful mechanism for bringing 
uniformity to enforcement discrepancies on the ground, there is a 
question whether it sufficiently responds to the unique kinds of policy 
problems that arise in immigration—especially nascent or rapidly 
changing ones. The limitation of top-down approaches may thus 
invite new inquiries into lower-level influences and the ways that 
ground-level officers provide input into emerging categories of 
individuals who deserve protection. 
B. Executive Branch Initiatives and Bureaucratic Buy-In 
Allowing lower-level agency officers to experiment with novel 
solutions on the ground helps to sidestep some of the limitations 
scholars have attributed to insufficiently anticipatory or responsive 
top-down controls. Decisions on the ground can suggest small 
adjustments in how and when discretion is exercised, bringing both 
 
 292. Nou, supra note 3, at 1765, 1766–69. 
 293. See id.; Stephenson, supra note 3. 
 294. Nou, supra note 3, at 1765. 
 295. Id. at 1766 n.1; Andrias, supra note 2, at 1083–84, 1104 (arguing for the creation of a 
new office in OMB “dedicated to problems of regulatory compliance . . . [to] further the 
efficiency and accountability goals of administration,” but noting that “a reactive system 
mirroring that of OIRA, whereby all significant individual enforcement actions require White 
House clearance, would undermine efficiency goals . . . [especially] when lower-level or local 
officials might have better information”).  
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greater precision and innovation.296 Perhaps most significant is that 
frontline officers can report the effectiveness of their experimentation 
up the chain of command and better enable policymakers to make 
positive choices regarding ex ante and ex post controls across entire 
agencies or even entire regulatory fields.297 
The point, of course, is not to question the aims of transparency 
that Cox, Rodríguez, and Andrias rightly praise. But to the extent 
that mechanisms for interbranch coordination already figure into the 
structure of everyday administrative enforcement, those internal 
separation of powers can also be relevant to the legitimacy of top-
down initiatives. Currently, there is little evidence that agencies 
actually draw on the expertise of career officers, who may understand 
the long-term interests of the agency as well as some political 
appointees who lack actual enforcement experience. Put differently, 
innovation may be less served by top-down administrative-law 
mechanisms than drawing on pockets of expertise that already exist. 
This does not mean that top-down solutions are always ill-advised; on 
the contrary, they are necessary to resolve discrepancies taking place 
on the ground and to ensure that immigration policy achieves the 
goals set by those both responsible and accountable for making 
across-the-board decisions. But leaving room for vertical dialogue and 
debate can fortify those top-down decisions. An organic approach 
based on bottom-up influences can have tangible and pragmatic 
benefits that not only promote equity in discrete cases, but also 
provide backing and normative support for agency-wide policies. 
Thus, however valuable “creative unilateralism” may be for 
immigration innovation,298 broad agency buy-in may be equally vital 
to ensure a rule-of-law content to executive enforcement policies—
which in turn supports the case for coordinate-branch deference. The 
bureaucratic ranks are not “beholden to any particular 
administration”299 and yet they are generally absent from discussions 
about immigration-law reform. To the extent that even the most 
 
 296. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1928 
(2013) (“Agencies . . . are constantly engaging with the public: with stakeholders and other 
parties affected by administrative action, social movement groups, business and industry 
associations, unions, and political representatives at all levels.”).  
 297. See Katyal, supra note 241, at 105 (“After all, the bureaucracy is the only actor in the 
political branches with a time horizon long enough to provide expertise without heavy political 
interference.”). 
 298. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 119. 
 299. Katyal, supra note 6, at 2317. 
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creative “Executive will need to develop policies and protocols to 
accomplish” an agenda,300 bureaucratic buy-in, and input, is an 
important part of that process. 
C. Bottom-Up Influences and Policy Learning 
Given the unlikelihood of comprehensive immigration reform 
within the near future,301 bottom-up innovation and laboratories of 
executive branch experimentation could be an important gap-filling 
device. Thus, as opposed to relying on ex ante controls that limit 
discretionary authority within strict parameters,302 frontline 
immigration officers should be encouraged to experiment with 
enforcement discretion as they react and adapt to changing 
circumstances. These agents can, through their exercises of case-by-
case discretion, propose novel solutions for consideration by the 
upper echelons of the administration.303 In that regard, frontline 
enforcement discretion and positive agency redundancies provide a 
testing ground for different viewpoints304 as well as a strong set of 
internal agency checks and balances305 in which “[d]iffering 
perspectives allow agencies to function more like laboratories, by 
devising new solutions to new problems.”306 
Although the pursuit of consistency in immigration enforcement 
is an important and worthwhile endeavor, the creation of formalized 
enforcement criteria could stifle appropriate, novel, and creative 
exercises of discretion—in turn preventing possibilities for new 
policies to emerge from the field.307 Uniform policy implementation 
that crowds out the possibility of lower-level experimentation 
provides no way to seek out possible alternatives. Thus, efforts to 
curtail such problem solving may have the unintended consequence of 
arresting this process of policy development. In other words, without 
frontline discretion—and the variance that comes with it—it may not 
be possible to identify who the next DREAMers will be.  
 
 300. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 125. 
 301. Rey Koslowski, Cross Country: Why New York Still Welcomes Immigrants, WALL ST. 
J., July 28, 2012, at A15. 
 302. See supra note 26. 
 303. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 2324. 
 304. Id. at 2324–25. 
 305. Id. at 2318. 
 306. Id. at 2325. 
 307. DAVIS, supra note 251, at 20 (“[C]reativity is impossible without discretion.”).  
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Recognizing this point, some higher-level officials have 
specifically called for more input from the ground level. In a recent 
speech to immigration lawyers, Deputy Secretary of Homeland 
Security Alejandro Mayorkas expressed optimism in having “ICE . . . 
engage . . . fully in the spirit of openness and transparency that are the 
hallmarks of good government and significantly in the service of 
justice . . . . [and] collaboration.”308 Many of the case studies in Part III 
illustrate such collaboration and the analogous ways that frontline 
officers creatively solved immigration problems in advance of 
subsequent across-the-board solutions. Within these disparate 
contexts, discretion at the bureaucratic level filtered up important 
issues “from the bottom of the agenda nearer to the top”309—arguably 
helping to advance important issues that required a categorical fix. 
Although regulatory overlap brings costs “in both dollars and 
legal certainty”310—not to mention inefficiency311—the combination of 
frontline discretion and positive agency redundancies can “encourage 
optimal legal evolution”312 and provide an array of benefits—including 
“acknowledging more effectively the complex identity of the subjects 
of regulation; overcoming regulatory inertia; encouraging innovation 
in regulatory design; and facilitating integration across jurisdictional 
lines.”313 By fostering a greater number of perspectives across a range 
of different situations, internal separation of powers within the 
executive branch can enhance mechanisms for dialogue, interchange, 
and progress. 
Finally, lower-level innovation addresses some of the narrowing 
effects of substantive agency regulations. As scholars have noted, 
“notice-and-comment rulemaking is ossifying, and formal 
 
 308. See supra note 94. 
 309. See David Luban, The Moral Complexity of Cause Lawyers Within the State, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 705, 711 (2012). 
 310. Ahdieh, supra note 52, at 896.  
 311. Todd Aagaard’s examination of OSHA and the EPA similarly found both positive and 
negative effects of regulatory overlap. Aagaard, supra note 50, at 238, 292. He found that 
regulatory overlap between OSHA and the EPA could “increase reliability and encourage 
policy innovation,” id. at 292, but also warned that “[r]egulatory overlap leads to duplicative 
regulation, which is wasteful, inefficient, and unduly burdensome.” Id. at 238. 
 312. Ahdieh, supra note 52, at 891. Ahdieh also argues that, “[w]hatever the source, 
distinctly situated agencies may encourage regulatory innovation, simply by offering each other 
something new.” Id. at 892. 
 313. Id. at 870. 
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adjudication is burdensome.”314 Preserving discretion on the ground 
allows officers, in their day-to-day activities, to develop creative 
solutions to problems by extending protections to new categories of 
immigrants in response to changing facts and circumstances. 
Although bureaucratic discretion brings variance and inconsistent 
application of the law, raising concerns of its own,315 the continued 
flexibility of prosecutorial discretion provides the breathing room 
necessary for regulatory innovation—a positive good in the 
enforcement context. Indeed, the lack of substantive regulation could 
be important to ensuring the continued existence of lower-level 
innovation. As one official in legacy INS noted, “[t]he diversity of 
human activities tends to continually generate new factors and issues 
which should logically affect the exercise of discretion.”316 
To be sure, controls are needed to prevent and cure vast 
discrepancies in lower-level implementation—a surrogate for the 
absent judiciary.317 Thus, oversight by the higher echelons at the back 
end of the process, including the president, is not only reasonable but 
also necessary to ensure that room for experimentation by 
decentralized actors is exercised appropriately and equitably.318 But, 
 
 314. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1490 (2005). 
 315. See supra notes 274–77 and accompanying text; cf. ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST 
OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 240 (2012) 
(“Equal treatment of litigants may be purchased at the cost of getting to a correct or better 
answer . . . .”). 
 316. COLIN S. DIVER, AGENCY ARTICULATION OF POLICY: REPORT TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 54 (1983).  
 317. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–92 (1999) 
(upholding broad executive branch enforcement discretion despite claims that prosecutorial 
discretion was used in a discriminatory manner). 
 318. Some level of bureaucratic insulation may be inevitable, see David B. Spence, Agency 
Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. 
RES. & THEORY 199, 207–09, 214 (1997), and indeed even desirable, Stephenson, supra note 3, 
at 57–58 (noting that “aggressive political monitoring that deprives agencies of policymaking 
autonomy may erode agency incentives to invest in expertise, thereby raising the costs to elected 
politicians of acquiring policy-relevant information”). But for scholars who advocate for 
presidential control, executive oversight is critical to ensure that agencies are democratically 
accountable. See Blumenstein, supra note 3, at 887 (“Given that agency rulemaking does 
contemplate a role for political input . . . it becomes hard to see why a presidential 
administration should not direct or at least influence its agents’ exercise of discretion within the 
agency bureaucracy.”); Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No 
Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 570–71 (1987) (“Presidential oversight . . . broadens . . . an 
unduly parochial approach by an agency and helps [it] take other values into account when 
reaching important decisions. . . . Presidential oversight . . . incorporat[es] the prevailing political 
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like federalism, ground-level executive experimentation provides a 
window into policy in action, requiring interaction—not 
atomization—among the higher and lower echelons of the federal 
bureaucracy.319 And just as the federalism debate informs 
conversations about exclusive federal authority over immigration, 
experimentation by frontline federal officers presents alternatives to 
the idea of top-down innovation, highlighting the importance of a 
vibrant interplay between higher- and lower-level agency actors 
charged with executing and implementing policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Many of the mechanisms associated with more experimental 
regimes remain untapped within federal immigration law. Thus, 
policymakers structuring agency relationships should consider 
additional ways for higher-level federal officials to pay attention to, 
and learn from, ground-level experiments. Exposure to lower-level 
problems and solutions would vest policymakers—including, but not 
limited to, the White House and the higher echelons of the executive 
branch—with greater understanding not only of the practicalities of 
day-to-day enforcement, but solutions forged on the ground. The 
result would be more workable recommendations for across-the-
board change and a lower likelihood of pushback or obstructionism 
from the ground level. 
One possible mechanism to enhance higher-level learning would 
involve increased field visits, where lower-level agents could report 
their struggles and successes. The agency might also encourage 
bureaucratic officers to attend conferences where they could explore 
and discuss, at a peer level, their responses to, and resolution of, 
complex and unforeseen cases. Finally, advisory councils composed of 
field directors could allow frontline officers to report their 
experiences. DOJ currently employs such a model in the Attorney 
General’s Advisory Committee of U.S. Attorneys. This council “gives 
United States Attorneys a voice in Department policies” and advises 
the attorney general by “mak[ing] recommendations to improve 
management of United States Attorney operations and the 
 
climate into an agency’s discretion while maintaining allegiance to the relevant factors defined 
in the legislation.”). 
 319. Cf. Rodríguez, supra note 5, at 608 (noting, as a benefit of immigration federalism, “the 
possibility of a relationship between the levels of government that is based on dialogue and 
compromise”). 
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relationship between DOJ and the federal prosecutors. It also helps 
formulate new programs for improvement of the criminal justice 
system and the delivery of legal services at all levels.”320 The DOJ 
model could easily be transplanted to DHS.321 
These mechanisms should also be paired with better data 
collection about the bases upon which lower-level officers currently 
exercise their discretion.322 The data should be collected, and shared, 
to promote better understanding among similarly situated actors 
throughout different parts of the federal bureaucracy. Although there 
is some indication that DHS already collects some data,323 a more 
scrupulous accounting of the bases for discretion could help identify 
problems that require across-the-board action, bringing uniformity 
and regularity to enforcement decisions. Enhancements such as these 
would present better opportunities for learning by those 
administrative arms of the executive that handle immigration. 
* * * 
Current agency structures, which already pair lower-level 
enforcement discretion with separated immigration functions across 
numerous different agencies and subagencies, should be better 
harnessed to promote laboratories for competing viewpoints and 
policy learning. Not unlike the federalist model, which posits novel 
and innovative immigration policy through the lens of a bottom-up 
 
 320. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, TITLE 3: EOUSA § 3-
2.530 (1997), http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-3-2000-united-states-attorneys-ausas-special-
assistants-and-agac#3-2.530 [http://perma.cc/X87Z-M5VX].  
 321. Currently, there is no field officer presence on DHS’s 38-member Homeland Security 
Advisory Council, which provides independent advice and recommendations to the Secretary 
“to support decision-making across the spectrum of homeland security operations.” United 
States Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council, http://www.
dhs.gov/homeland-security-advisory-council [http://perma.cc/4QTJ-UXDG]; see United States 
Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council Members, http://www.
dhs.gov/homeland-security-advisory-council-members [http://perma.cc/W7CP-N4J4] (detailing 
the council’s membership).  
 322. The Office of the Inspector General published a report on May 4, 2015, making a 
similar recommendation. Office of the Inspector General, DHS Missing Data Needed to 
Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts (May 4, 2015), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-85_May15.pdf [http://perma.cc/YS8F-JULM]. The report recommended 
that DHS “develop and implement a plan to collect, analyze, and report data on the 
Department’s use of prosecutorial discretion to assess immigration enforcement activities and 
improve future policy.” Id. at 7. 
 323. See supra notes 217–20, 228, 276–77 and accompanying text.  
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process generated by state and local governments,324 internal 
separation of powers within the executive branch could put current 
agency structures to more fruitful and innovative ends. This sort of 
creative discretionary decisionmaking at the ground level lays a 
foundation for the possible emergence of large-scale and across-the-
board solutions. Moreover, executive branch programs that enjoy 
broad bureaucratic support are better insulated from congressional or 
judicial override. Although the top-down theory of innovation 
resonates with much of the surrounding administrative-law literature, 
a competing theory couched in frontline bureaucratic discretion may 
ultimately prove more durable, both in the federal courts and in the 
court of public opinion. 
 
 
 324. Cf. Rodríguez, supra note 5, at 573 (“[F]ederalism serves as a crucial mechanism for 
shaping and managing national identity [and] the process of forging such identity is not a top-
down, but a bottom-up process.”). 
